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Abstract
Some financial assets experience higher average returns than others. Asset-pricing
theory suggests that this is due to the amount of systematic risk of that particular asset:
the riskier the asset, the higher the average return. I hypothesize that one of these sys-
tematic risk factors is political risk, the result of political uncertainty. This dissertation
examines the effect of political risk, in the form of terrorism risk and political regime
change risk, on asset prices using linear factor asset pricing models. I find that ter-
rorism risk is a significantly priced risk factor for nonindustry portfolios from January
1971 through December 2010. Results, however, differ when the data is divided into
time periods before and after September 11, 2001, with the latter period indicating no
risk from terror attacks. I further analyze the determinants of terrorism finding that
social and geographic variables contribute more to terror activity than economic vari-
ables. I discover that political regime change risk is a nontrivial risk factor from 1927
through 2009, though risk premia results are smaller from industry returns than returns
organized based on firm size and book-equity to market-equity. I also find that average
excess returns are larger when the government is under the control of the Democratic
party rather than for the Republican party for that same time period. Both sets of risk
premia are ascertained by regression-based and nonlinear estimation methodologies.
I investigate the small sample properties of two cross-sectional regression methods,
ordinary and generalized least squares, and two generalized method of moments es-
timators, two-step and iterative. Using monte carlo simulations, I determine that the
least squares regression methods outperform the generalized method of moments esti-
mation procedures in terms of rejection rates and point estimates in small samples.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
There is a longstanding relationship between politics and the financial markets. But does political
risk, which is based on the uncertainty over the ramifications of possible government actions and
policies, have a direct affect on asset prices? This dissertation examines that very question. I
hypothesize that political risk, the result of political uncertainty, is a contributing risk factor in
the pricing of securities. I price this factor by creating two variables that proxy for political risk
and then perform regression-based and nonlinear analyses to examine the risk premia incurred.
In general, few factors have been accepted as having an effect on asset prices wherein investors
require compensation for holding securities that contain this risk. This investigation supports the
argument that political risk is an important factor that cannot be overlooked in the pricing of assets.
I examine the effect of political risk, in the form of terrorism risk and political regime change
risk, on securities pricing. Terrorism risk can be indicative of underlying political unrest and
uncertainty. The connection between terrorism and economic, political, and social unrest is a topic
of much interest in the time since the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon. Unfortunately, little research focuses on the economic determinants, or the
economic conditions and factors, that contribute to the incidence of terrorism (see Abadie (2006),
Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana (2004), Piazza (2006), and Tavares (2004)). But the research
that does exist indicates that there is a significant relationship between economic factors (such as
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country income, unemployment, and economic growth), social factors (such as population, income
disparity, and political freedom), and the number of terrorist events worldwide. These results imply
that terrorist activity is indicative of larger problems with the economic and political fundamentals.
If terrorism is indeed indicative of greater economic and political discontent, then it can be used as
a proxy for political uncertainty. So it is in this context that I assess terrorism risk.
In Chapter 2, I hypothesize that terrorism risk, as a proxy for underlying political risk, is priced
and I discover that this price is significant and positive. I institute a terrorism risk index based
on the number of terrorist events that occurred within the United States between January 1971 and
December 2010. I then perform analysis with a standard multifactor asset pricing model using both
regression-based and generalized method of moments estimation techniques to examine the terror-
ism risk premium. Results suggest terrorism risk is priced in U.S. financial markets for nonindustry
portfolios and the associated risk premium is positive and significant. However, separating the data
into time periods before and after September 11, 2001 generates differing results. I discover that
terrorism risk is not priced in the time after 9/11. I further examine the country-level determinants
of terrorism using data on 148 countries from 1990-2008. Using Hausman-Taylor estimation, I
find that social variables such as education levels and democracy variables have more of an affect
on terrorism than economic variables like country income and employment rates.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to measure political risk. While uncertainty about particular
government policies and the related costs are not easy to quantify, it is possible to measure political
regime change. Though we cannot be certain which policies will be chosen nor the political costs
of those policies, if we learn which regime is in control of the government at the time of the
policy change, we will have some indication as to what type of policy is more likely and thus what
type of costs to anticipate. In the third chapter, I investigate political risk in the form of political
regime change. Using 25 portfolios organized on size and book-to-market equity and 49 industry
portfolios, I determine that average excess returns are higher when the federal government is under
the control of the Democratic Party rather than the Republican Party. I hypothesize that this is due
to the switching of control of the federal government from Republican to Democrat and I create
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a proxy for political risk using a dummy variable that accounts for this political regime change. I
then estimate the risk premium using cross-sectional regression and nonlinear least squares. Using
returns data from 1927 through 2009, I determine that the risk premium for this factor is significant
and positive and that political regime change, along with the Fama-French factors, explains well
the variation in the cross section of nonindustry returns.
Chapter 4 is a comparison of the common methods used to estimate linear factor asset pricing
models, the means by which I investigate political risk. Using the beta-representation of the linear
factor asset pricing model, I compare regression-based and generalized method of moments esti-
mation techniques using simulated data. I analyze each method under two specifications in small
samples. Previous research indicates that while regression-based estimation does not account for
heteroskedasticity or serial correlation, it is the most robust technique to use in larger samples.
GMM estimation, on the other hand, does account for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, but
tends to perform poorly when the time series is small relative to the number of assets.
In Chapter 4, I generate twenty-five excess returns using factors simulated to mimic the po-
litical regime change dummy factor and excess market return factor from Chapter 3. In terms of
power and point estimates, I find that the least squares regressors, ordinary and generalized, out-
perform the generalized method of moments estimators, two-step and iterative. While, in general,
the least squares methods are preferred to GMM, GLS tends to perform better than OLS for power,
however, ordinary least squares delivers better point estimates. Both generalized method of mo-
ments procedures exhibit lower power and more bias in estimates, supporting the argument that
GMM does exhibit small sample bias. While all methodologies demonstrate capabilities in reject-
ing a false null hypothesis, all methods, in turn, also tend to overreject a true null hypothesis. This
indicates that discretion and economic theory must be utilized in the discovery of asset-pricing risk
factors.
Chapter 5 provides the concluding remarks of this analysis on political risk and the pricing
of securities. It also provides directions for future research. Supporting chapters including the
references and appendices can be found sequentially.
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Chapter 2
Estimating the Market Price of Terrorism
Risk
2.1 Introduction
Recent testimony at the trial for Adis Medunjanin, a suspected al-Qaeda recruit who is thought to
be responsible for the attempted bombing of the New York subway system in 2009, revealed that
the Manhattan subway was not the original target of the terror plot (Stringer (2012)). According to
the Wall Street Journal, one of the possible targets included the New York Stock Exchange. It is no
surprise that one of the many targets of the al-Qaeda terror plot consisted of one of America’s most
important financial and economic symbols, the NYSE. It is well-known that terrorist organizations
such as al-Qaeda, the Irish Republican Army, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine,
amongst many others, are driven by perceived economic, political, and social injustices in an effort
to discourage future globalization and the economic prosperity of other countries (see GTD (2011)
and Malhorta (2008)).
The connection between terrorism and economic, political, and social unrest is a topic of much
interest in the time since the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon, another al-Qaeda terror plot. Unfortunately, little research focuses on the economic
4
determinants, or the economic conditions and factors, that contribute to the incidence of terrorism
(see Abadie (2006), Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana (2004), Piazza (2006), and Tavares (2004)).
But the research that does exist indicates that there is a significant relationship between economic
factors (such as country income, unemployment, and economic growth), social factors (such as
population, income disparity, and political freedom), and the number of terrorist events worldwide.
These results imply that terrorist activity is indicative of larger problems with the economic and
political fundamentals. While we typically think of terrorist regimes as extremists, far-removed
from the mainstream political mindset, if terrorism is instead representative of a general, under-
lying political sentiment, then terrorist activity can be seen as the beginning of a shift in political
preferences and the consequent economic policies. In this context, terrorism can be viewed as a
type of political uncertainty because terror activities have an unknown and unpredictable effect on
political, and subsequently economic, outcomes. It is with this reasoning that I examine terrorism
risk.
I hypothesize that terrorism risk, as a proxy for underlying political risk, is priced and I discover
that this price is significant and positive. This investigation discovers the terrorism risk premium by
using a linear factor asset pricing model and a terrorism risk index based on the number of monthly
domestic terror events within the United States. I find that terrorism risk is positively priced for
nonindustry returns between January 1971 and December 2010. Results, however, are inconsistent
when the data is separated into time periods before and after September 11, 2001. This would
suggest that the number of terrorist attacks may no longer be a concern in the American financial
markets.
Since I am utilizing terror events as representative of underlying economic risk from a shift in
fundamentals, it would be remiss not to further analyze those economic factors that contribute to
terror. Perhaps if we discover the macroeconomic factors that contribute to terror activity, we can
hedge terrorism risk by incorporating those variables as additional factors in asset pricing. In the
final part of this investigation, I analyze the determinants of terror attacks using Hausman Taylor
analysis, a panel estimation technique. There is some debate as to the effect of country income,
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political rights, and the level of democracy of a country on terrorist activity (see Abadie (2006),
Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana(2004), Kis-Katos, Liebert, and Schulze (2011)). In an effort
to reconcile these disagreements, I hypothesize that all three of these variables have a negative
effect on the number of terror attacks. I further hypothesize that income disparities contribute
to terrorism, with a larger disparity having a larger effect. Using data provided by the START
program out of the University of Maryland, I perform analysis on a time series of country-level
terrorist events spanning eighteen years and 148 countries (GTD (2011)). I show that income has
no effect on the amount of country-level terrorist activity and a decrease in civil liberties increases
terror.
2.2 Related Literature
Most research into terror and the economy exists on the economic consequences of terror attacks.
Previous inquiries indicate that terrorism has significant, albeit short-run consequences for the
macroeconomy, industry, and the financial sector. Blomberg, Hess, and Orphanides (2004) de-
termine that terror has a small and less persistent negative effect on growth. They further find
a redirection of spending away from investment and towards government expenditures. Tavares
(2004) analyzes both the costs of terrorism and the determinants. Tavares supports the findings of
Blomberg et. al. (2004) by ascertaining that output costs are smaller in a democracy. Llussá and
Tavares (2011) suggest that GDP is affected through private consumption and investment. Abadie
and Gardeazabal (2008) further discover the terrorism affects the movement of capital across the
country and subsequently affects GDP through investment. Berrebi and Klor (2010) focus their
analysis on the defense industry, but they uncover a negative impact not only on defense-related
companies but nondefense-related companies as well.
While there is some evidence to suggest that terrorism affects investment, previous analyses on
terrorism and the financial markets largely focuses on stock prices and volatilities. Arin, Ciferri,
and Spagnolo (2008) find a significant impact of terror on the markets. This is supported by Ches-
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ney, Reshetar, and Karaman (2011), who discover an effect in the stocks, bonds, and commodities
markets. Karolyi and Martell (2006) report a drop in stock prices on the day of a terror event. Levy
and Galili (2006) further analyze the effect of terrorism on daily trade volume but from the per-
spective of emotion and fear. Melnick and Eldor (2010) and Drakos (2010) also address investor
fear and sentiment and analyze its effect on the stock exchange.
Due to the overwhelming significance of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, much analyses
exists on the financial implications. Charles and Darné (2006) examine the effect of the September
11th attacks on international stock markets discovering large shocks both temporary and perma-
nent. In terms of risk, Choudry (2005) looks at the effect of September 11th on the time-varying
betas of U.S. companies finding most companies affected, supporting the findings of Berrebi and
Klor (2010). Terror attack risk is a source of much concern for industries and possible hedging
strategies are investigated in Gulley and Sultan (2006) and Karloyi (2007) with mixed results.
The terrorism risk premium, on the other hand, has never been directly measured by way of
linear factor model estimation. This endeavor is the first exercise to assess terrorism risk and its
effect on asset pricing. This research is significant because if terrorism is indeed representative of
underlying political discontent and the related risk is significant, then it can be used as a proxy for
political risk. It is from this perspective that I analyze terrorism.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Terror Events
I obtain data on terrorist events within the United States from the Global Terrorism Database
(GTD (2011)). Sponsored by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses
to Terrorism (START) out of the University of Maryland, the Global Terrorism Database is the
largest, open-source database cataloguing worldwide terrorist events from January 1970 through
December 2010. The GTD contains information on more than 98,000 domestic, international
and transnational events in over 200 countries. Each event contains between 45-120 variables of
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incident information such as date, attack type, location, target information, and much more. For
the financial analysis of this endeavor, I focus on those events that occurred within the borders of
the United States between 1971 and 2010 (I exclude 1970 as this year demonstrates a significant
number of terrorist events, not only within the United States but around the world, and is thus a
major outlier). For the estimation of the determinants, I use those events that occurred domestically
for 148 countries from 1990-2008.
A shortcoming of the GTD is the lack of a single definition of terrorism. While the database
does maintain several variables on inclusion criteria, which was formulated by the GTD advisory
board, the final decision to include an incident is made by GTD supervisory staff and management
using the aforementioned guidelines. Due to the difficult nature of determining a universally ac-
ceptable definition of terrorism, and in an effort to be as inclusive as possible, the encoded events
span a range of definitions and leave it to the researcher to decide which events to utilize in their
research. It should be noted, however, that the GTD does not include information on foiled or
failed terror plots, threats, or state-sponsored terrorism. This is unfortunate, as investment is very
much affected by perception and fear which can result from attempted or planned terror attacks.
And state-sponsored terror can further lead to a change in economic principles, directly affecting
political risk.
For the purposes of this investigation, it is not necessary to employ a formal definition of
terrorism. The inclusion criteria utilized by the GTD advisory board is sufficient and though the
following inclusion criteria does not need to be fully met to be included in this research, it does
allude to the type of events catalogued in the database:
Criterion I: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal,
Criterion II: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some
other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims,
Criterion III: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.
From this information, I create a simple count variable, which I refer to as the terrorism index.
Each event that satisfies any of the above criterion are coded as ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise. The events
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are then summed over the course of a month, creating a monthly time series of attacks that occurred
within the United States between 1971 and 2010. I then portion the data into two subgroups: the
time before September 11, 2001 and the time after. Neither group includes the month of September
2001 as the events of 9/11 alone marked a major turning point in U.S. history in terms of terror
awareness and event significance and is thus an outlier.
2.3.2 Returns and Factors
2.3.2.1 30 Industry Portfolios and 100 Portfolios
I obtain portfolios from Kenneth R. French’s data library (French (2012)). I use both the 30 indus-
try portfolios and the 100 portfolios formed on size and book-to-market value. The firms used to
calculate the 30 industry portfolios are taken from the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. Each firm
is assigned to a particular industry portfolio at the end of June based on its SIC code at that time.
The 100 portfolios are sorted based on the intersections of ten portfolios formed on size and ten
portfolios formed on the ratio of book-equity to market-equity.
2.3.2.2 Fama-French Factors
In the seminal paper by Fama and French (1993), it was shown that the cross-section of average
stock returns, and subsequently a large portion of systematic risk, can be explained by three com-
mon risk factors: an overall market factor, a factor related to firm size, and a factor related to firm
book-to-market value. The market factor is calculated as the excess market return, or the value-
weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks minus the one-month Treasury bill
rate. The firm factors are both calculated using six portfolios sorted based on size and book-to-
market value and are meant to mimic those risk factors using portfolio returns. Size is calculated
as the stock price times the number of shares. The portfolio is created based on the monthly
difference between the average returns of the small-stock portfolios and the average returns of
the big-stock portfolios (Small-Big). The book-to-market portfolio is calculated similarly by first
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computing the ratio of the book value of the firm’s stock to its market value. The portfolio is based
on the difference between the average returns of the value portfolios minus the average returns of
the growth portfolios (High-Low). The Fama-French factors are also obtained from Kenneth R.
French’s website (French (2012)).
2.4 Methodology
Consider the basic pricing formula, pt = E[mt+1xt+1] or equivalently 1 = E[mt+1,Rt+1] where
Rt+1 =
xt+1
pt
are gross returns on assets (Cochrane (2005)). Asset pricing models usually only differ
in their interpretation of the stochastic discount factor, mt+1. An important class of asset pricing
models is the linear factor model, or the linear beta pricing model, which interprets the stochastic
discount factor as a linear combination of various pervasive risk factors in the form of m = b0−
f ′b1 (in this example, I use a single factor and I eliminate the time subscripts for simplicity). It
can be shown that the linear beta restriction is equivalent to the linear stochastic discount factor
assumption (Cochrane (2005)). Excess returns can also be used in place of gross returns to simplify
analysis, but the use of excess returns requires slightly different initial assumptions: m = 1−b( f −
E[ f ]) (see Chapter 4 for further details). To test whether terrorism risk accounts for the variation
in the cross section of asset returns, I utilize excess returns in standard linear factor asset pricing
models.
Denote by Rt a vector of returns in excess of the risk free rate on N assets at time t and ft as
the vector of K economy-wide factors at time t. Now assume that returns follow the linear process
Ri,t = αi + f ′t βi +ui,t , i = 1, . . . ,N, t = 1, . . . ,T (2.1)
where the errors ui,t are uncorrelated with the factors for all i with mean zero and βi is the vector
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of betas, or factor loadings, for asset i which is given by
βi = E[( ft−E[ ft ])( ft−E[ ft ])′]−1E[(Ri,t−E[Ri,t ])( ft−E[ ft ])], (2.2a)
ΣR = E[(Ri,t−E[Ri,t ])(Ri,t−E[Ri,t ])′], (2.2b)
Σ f = E[( ft−E[ ft ])( ft−E[ ft ])′]. (2.2c)
Under these assumptions, the linear beta pricing model places the restriction
E[Ri,t ] = a0 +λ ′βi, i = 1, . . . ,N (2.3)
where λ is the vector of risk premia and a0 is a vector of constants (see Jagannathan, Schaumburg,
and Zhou (2010)). Another way to interpret the two equations above is to consider the factor
loadings, βi, as the relationship between the risk factors, ft , and the returns, Rt . Then λ can be
interpreted as the price of risk or the amount of compensation that investors require for holding
onto assets with the risk factors present. If λ is positive and significant, then we would say that the
factor is priced because it does explain the variation in the cross section of asset prices.
Classic articles by Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986) and Fama and French (1993) use linear factor
models to explain the cross sections of assets, each with their own risk factors. While Chen,
Roll, and Ross (1986) use macroeconomic variables in their analysis, Fama and French create
mimicking portfolios that capture the pervasive risks presented by firm characteristics such as firm
size and book-to-market effects. Along with these two factors, Fama and French also use the
market portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate to create the Fama-French factors which are now
commonly used in empirical studies as they do indeed account for much of the variation in the
cross section of security returns.
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2.4.1 Cross-Sectional Regression
There are several methods to evaluate linear factor models, two of which I employ in this empirical
investigation (I follow the notation of Jagannathan, Skoulakis, and Wang (2010)). The first is
the simplest and most robust, cross-sectional regression which I also use in Chapter 3. Cross-
sectional regression estimation is based on the Fama-MacBeth technique developed in Fama and
MacBeth (1973) to assess the relationship between expected returns and factor betas (Jagannathan,
Skoulakis, and Wang (2010)). It is performed in two passes, which is why it is generally referred
to as “two-pass regression". The first pass is a time series regression to estimate the relationship
between the returns and the factor loadings (betas). The second is a cross sectional regression to
measure the relationship between the factor loadings and average returns.
Consider the following reinterpretation of the beta representation,
E[Rt ] = a01N +Bλ = Xc (2.4)
where
X = [1N B], c = [a0 λ ′]′, (2.5)
X is a N x (K +1) matrix and c is a (K +1) vector of risk premia. Then standard OLS estimation
of c yields
c = (X ′X)−1X ′E[Rt ]. (2.6)
Two-pass regression is essentially the same estimation technique as Fama-MacBeth estimation,
only in a slightly different form. Unlike Fama-MacBeth, which estimates a separate risk premium
ĉt over the full cross section at each time period in the second pass and then averages over all
estimates, cross-sectional regression estimates a single ĉ over the full time series using an average
of the returns for each cross section. Both forms yield identical results for ĉ and Var(ĉ) mak-
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ing them equivalent and interchangeable estimation methods (Kleibergen (2009) and Jagannathan,
Skoulakis, and Wang (2010)).
Regression can be performed either with or without the constant a0. Per theory, this vector
should equal the zero-vector. If regression is run allowing for estimation of the constant, then the
parameter can be tested for significance (Cochrane (2005)). If the model is correctly specified,
then a0 = 0N (Jagannathan, Schaumburg, and Zhou (2010)). Most researchers prefer to estimate
the constant along with the other parameters as a test of model validity.
We can further work backwards from the definition of B and write the time series regression as
Rt = E[Rt ]+B( ft−E[ ft ])+ut (2.7)
where ut has mean zero and is uncorrelated with the factors. If we substitute for the expected
returns the beta pricing restriction, then we derive the return process
Rt = a01N +B( ft−E[ ft ]+λ )+ut (2.8)
Of course, two-pass estimation is robust and easy to apply in large samples, however it does
impose assumptions that are not overly realistic and, the larger problem, the second pass estima-
tion requires the use of an estimated regressor causing the classic error-in-the-variables problem.
The standard assumptions for this estimation process include conditional homoskedasticity, which
holds when the returns and factors are identical and independently normally distributed (Jagan-
nathan, Schaumburg, and Zhou (2010)). This is a nice assumption because standard t-tests can
then be calculated to test the validity of the relevant coefficients. But there is some empirical
evidence to indicate that returns are actually heteroskedastic, nonnormally distributed, and even
autocorrelated.
The error-in-the-variables problem is also not one that can be overlooked. There are several
prescribed methods for compensating for this problem. One method is to use portfolios instead of
individual stocks as the testing assets. It is believed that the large number of stocks employed are
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estimated precisely enough to compensate for the error. Another method, suggested by Fama and
Macbeth (1973), is to estimate a separate variance matrix accounting for the error in the second
stage, however, this method has proven to overstate the precision of estimates and is subsequently
inefficient under the assumption of conditional homoskedasticity. And yet another method is to
use generalized least squares in the second pass of estimation. c is then formed as
c = (X ′QX)−1X ′QE[Rt ] (2.9)
where Q is positive definite N x N matrix. With this method, portfolio formation may not even
be necessary. This is the method I utilize to account for the error-in-the-variables problem in the
empirical section.
2.4.2 Generalized Method of Moments Estimation
The assumptions and problems posed by the cross-sectional regression method make some re-
searchers uncomfortable. So I also examine the cross section of returns using generalized method
of moments estimation. This technique is appealing to use under more realistic assumptions
because it allows for serial correlation and conditional heteroskedasticity (see Jagannathan, Sk-
oulakis, and Wang (2010)). However, GMM is the most efficient unbiased estimator when returns
and factors are homoskedastic and independent.
The generalized method of moments is further advantageous because it allows estimations of
all model parameters in a single pass, eliminating the earlier error-in-the-variables problem. But it
should be noted that GMM has been known to overreject models with small sample size and time
series compared to other methods of estimation (more on this in Chapter 4). GMM can be per-
formed using either the linear beta pricing model representation or the earlier stochastic discount
factor representation. Both are asymptotically equivalent, so for comparison, I will estimate the
empirical model using the linear factor representation.
Remember the return process generated in the previous section, ignoring the constant for the
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time being:
Rt = B( ft−E[ ft ]+λ )+ut (2.10)
where B is the vector of factor loadings, B = E[Rt ,( ft − E[ ft ])]Var[ ft ]−1. Also remember the
properties of ut
E[ut ] = 0N (2.11a)
E[ut f ′t ] = 0NxK (2.11b)
From the above equations the moment restrictions are then
E[Rt−B( ft−E[ ft ]+λ )] = 0N (2.12a)
E[[Rt−B( ft−E[ ft ]+λ )] f ′t ] = 0NxK (2.12b)
E[ ft−E[ ft ]] = 0K (2.12c)
The last equation identifies the risk premium λ . These three equations combine to formulate
the expected value of the moment restriction, or more precisely E[g(xt ,θ0)] = 0N where θ =
[δ ′ vec(B)′ µ ′]′. We then use the sample analogue gT (θ) = 1T Σ
T
t=1g(xt ,θ) to solve
min
θ
gT (θ)′S−1T gT (θ), (2.13)
where ST is the consistent estimator of the spectral density matrix of g(xt ,θ), and find the GMM
estimator θ̂ .
To test the model’s validity, I compute the J-statistic
JT = T gT (θ̂T )′S−1T gT (θ̂T )
D→ χ2(N−K) as T → ∞, (2.14)
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which is χ2 in asymptotic distribution. In most applications, GMM is performed either in two
stages or iteratively, the difference being the number of times the weighting matrix is reestimated.
For this analysis, I employ two-step GMM for its simplicity.
2.5 Empirical Results
2.5.1 Summary Statistics
Looking at the summary statistics in Table 2.1, it is apparent that a sizable share of terrorist events
occurred before September 11, 2001. For a period of 368 months, not including the year 1970, the
total number of terror events before 9/11 is 1739, out of a possible 2359 for the entire time period
of 492 months. The average number of monthly events before 9/11 are not too different from the
total average at 4.73 and 4.79, respectively. Standard deviation is also similar at 5 events before
September 11th and 7.59 for the total time period.
The time period after September 11, 2001, however, maintains noticeably different results.
The duration of 111 months is not even half the size of the time period before 9/11, not including
the month of September 2011. The shorter time series also yields a smaller number of events
at 156 with a smaller average number of monthly events at 1.41 and standard deviation of 2.47
events. These markedly different results for the time period subsets comes as little surprise as the
occurrence of the September 11th terror attacks is not the median event of the total time series.
Notice that the maximum number of monthly events for the total time series is 65, while the
maximum number of events for the time periods before and after September 11th are 38 and 20,
respectively. Indeed, April 1970 saw the most terrorism at 65 events with other months of 1970
experiencing numbers as high as 62, 55, and 49 events. For this reason, I eliminate the year 1970
from the period before 9/11.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for the Terrorism Index
Terrorism Index Full Time Series Before Sept 11, 2001 After Sept 11, 2001
Date Range Jan 1971-Dec 2010 Jan 1971-Aug 2001 Oct 2001-Dec 2010
Period (Months) 492 368 111
Total Events 2359 1739 156
Mean 4.795 4.726 1.405
Standard Dev 7.594 5.001 2.473
Minimum 0 0 0
Maximum 65 38 20
2.5.2 Cross-Sectional Regression
Two-pass least squares regression yields incongruent results for the 30 industry portfolios and
100 portfolios. For the 30 industry portfolios, the terrorism index is not priced, save for the time
after September 11, 2001 where it maintains mild significance in the presence of the Fama-French
factors (see Table 2.2). Interestingly, in all time periods, the constant is only three times statistically
no different from zero. In the time after September 11th, the second scenario, which includes
only the terrorism index and the market return, performs the best with both factors maintaining
significance and the constant invalid. But the results for the analysis for the full time series should
reflect the results of the subset if they are valid, which it does not. Although the terrorism index
does not do well to explain the cross section of the industry portfolios, neither do the Fama-French
factors.
Unlike the 30 industry portfolios, for the 100 portfolios the terrorism index factor for the total
time period and the time before 9/11 is significant and positive. Results for the 100 portfolios in
Table 2.3 are consistent with the expectation that terrorism risk is significantly priced, although that
price is surprisingly high. The market factor performs well when combined with the size factor,
however, the book-to-market equity factor only performs well when the market factor is excluded
from the model. The constant term is also significantly different from zero in all three time periods.
For the total time period, the terrorism risk premium is considerably larger than the premia for
the other factors. This is also true for the time period before September 11th, although this risk
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premium is just slightly larger than for the full time series. The lack of terrorist events since that
fateful day might explain the smaller risk premium. The risk premium further decreases when the
other factors are included in the model. After 9/11, risk premium is not much larger than zero,
but much more in line with the other factors. This result implies that investors now require less
return for holding onto risky portfolios. Notice also that in the fourth scenario the terrorism index
is priced in the presence of the Fama-French factors.
Table 2.2: Risk Premia(λi) Results Using Cross-Sectional Regression Estimation– 30 Industry
Portfolios
Time Period Terrorism Index Market Small-Big High-Low Constant
Jan 1971-Dec 2010 0.655 0.581***
(0.85) (18.24)
0.838 -0.09 0.669***
(1.02) (-0.62) (4.60)
0.749 -0.085 -0.002 0.619***
(0.87) (-0.81) (-0.01) (11.59)
0.536 0.171 -0.187 0.003 0.98**
(0.55) (0.48) (-0.79) (0.03) (1.93)
Jan 1971-Aug 2001 0.086 0.578***
(Before 9/11/01) (0.12) (16.09)
0.278 -0.079 0.651***
(0.34) (-0.44) (3.87)
0.09 -0.331*** -0.221** 0.599***
(0.13) (-2.77) (-1.98) (11.92)
-0.395 0.412 -0.49*** -0.142 0.304
(-0.52) (1.29) (-2.90) (-1.13) (1.30)
Oct 2001-Dec 2010 1.323* 0.755***
(After 9/11/01) (1.79) (7.99)
1.443** 0.617** 0.093
(2.14) (2.50) (0.33)
1.534* 0.343 0.096 0.423**
(1.83) (1.55) (0.31) (2.24)
1.57* 0.679 -0.084 0.079 0.05
(1.92) (1.33) (-0.22) (0.26) (0.15)
Two-pass regression using monthly excess returns: OLS first pass, GLS second pass. z-statistics are reported in parenthesis below regression
estimates. ***significance at the 1% level, **significance at the 5% level, *significance at the 10% level. Terrorism index calculated using data
obtained from the Global Terrorism Database. 30 industry portfolios and Fama-French factors obtained from Kenneth R. French’s website.
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Table 2.3: Risk Premia(λi) Results Using Cross-Sectional Regression Estimation– 100 Portfo-
lios
Time Period Terrorism Index Market Small-Big High-Low Constant
Jan 1971-Dec 2010 6.017*** 0.579***
(17.57) (10.50)
6.293*** -1.507*** 2.186***
(19.90) (-4.65) (6.25)
5.702*** 0.458*** 0.739*** 0.435***
(17.80) (3.88) (5.96) (4.35)
5.609*** -2.67*** 0.78*** 0.198 2.817***
(19.79) (-5.31) (6.47) (1.33) (6.16)
Jan 1971-Aug 2001 7.336*** 0.467***
(Before 9/11/01) (14.05) (5.73)
7.784*** -1.889*** 2.424***
(16.05) (-4.57) (5.57)
6.735*** 0.766*** 1.027*** 0.434***
(13.47) (4.30) (5.56) (3.30)
6.842*** -4.004*** 0.969*** -0.171 3.773***
(15.26) (-4.97) (5.89) (-0.58) (5.53)
Oct 2001-Dec 2010 0.142 0.781***
(After 9/11/01) (0.49) (21.39)
0.108 0.293 0.446*
(0.37) (1.42) (1.87)
0.323 0.319*** 0.229*** 0.24**
(1.28) (4.25) (2.85) (2.49)
0.533** -0.92*** 0.54*** 0.321*** 0.959***
(2.21) (-3.91) (6.00) (4.09) (4.68)
Two-pass regression using monthly excess returns: OLS first pass, GLS second pass. z-statistics are reported in parenthesis below OLS regression
estimates. ***significance at the 1% level, **significance at the 5% level, *significance at the 10% level. Terrorism index calculated using data
obtained from the Global Terrorism Database. 100 portfolios and Fama-French factors obtained from Kenneth R. French’s website.
2.5.3 Generalized Method of Moments Estimation
The results from two stage generalized method of moments estimation are not too dissimilar nu-
merically from the results of the cross-sectional regression. For the 30 industry portfolios, the ter-
rorism index is unpriced throughout. This conflicts with the previous research by Choudry (2005)
and Berrebi and Klor (2010) who discover the effects of terrorism reflected in industry returns.
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Interestingly, the model performs well in the time period since 9/11, but only when the market
factor is the only factor present. Constants are mostly different from zero.
Table 2.4: Risk Premia(λi) Results Using Generalized Method of Moments Estimation– 30
Industry Portfolios
Time Period Terrorism Index Market Small-Big High-Low Const J-Statistic
Jan 1971-Dec 2010 0.367 0.577*** 0.765 (p = 0.682)
(0.96) (0.035)
0.408 -0.010 0.672*** 1.445 (p = 0.836)
(0.819) (0.123) (0.142)
0.656 -0.069 -0.033 0.571*** 3.98 (p = 0.679)
(0.896) (0.082) (0.087) (0.051)
0.031 0.157 -0.172 -0.05 0.472*** 3.835 (p = 0.872)
(1.007) (0.24) (0.18) (0.081) (0.165)
Jan 1971-Aug 2001 -0.058 0.59*** 1.797 (p = 0.407)
(Before 9/11/01) (0.63) (0.039)
-0.059 -0.076 0.672*** 4.021 (p = 0.403)
(0.628) (0.17) (0.165)
0.031 -0.333*** -0.226** 0.607*** 4.527 (p = 0.606)
(0.551) (0.102) (0.095) (0.046)
-0.555 0.308 -0.411*** -0.174* 0.372** 6.056 (p = 0.641)
(0.60) (0.231) (0.143) (0.092) (0.162)
Oct 2001-Dec 2010 0.553 0.732*** 0.881 (p = 0.644)
(After 9/11/01) (0.687) (0.094)
0.794 0.477*** 0.292 2.67 (p = 0.615)
(0.64) (0.166) (0.183)
0.675 0.309* -0.019 0.465*** 1.289 (p = 0.972)
(0.717) (0.185) (0.234) (0.146)
0.876 0.608** -0.187 0.192 0.187 4.731 (p = 0.786)
(0.647) (0.288) (0.27) (0.251) (0.162)
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis below GMM regression estimates. ***significance at the 1% level, **significance at the 5% level,
*significance at the 10% level. Terrorism index calculated using data obtained from the Global Terrorism Database. 30 industry portfolios and
Fama-French factors obtained from Kenneth R. French’s website.
For the 100 portfolios, GMM estimation prices terrorism positively throughout the full time
series and before 9/11. But notice that for the time period after September 11th, the terrorism index
premium is significantly priced when the Fama-French factors are also present. This is consistent
with the cross-sectional regression results. Perhaps this is indicative of a small amount of political
risk in the time since 9/11. Consistent with those results, too, the terrorism risk premium is also
surprisingly large relative to the other premia. The J-statistic is calculated to assess each individual
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model’s validity. The null hypothesis for the J-statistic, that the model is correctly specified and
the GMM is small, is rejected throughout for both sets of portfolios.
Table 2.5: Risk Premia(λi) Results Using Generalized Method of Moments Estimation– 100
Portfolios
Time Period Terrorism Index Market Small-Big High-Low Const J-Statistic
Jan 1971-Dec 2010 5.315*** 0.604*** 1.733 (p = 0.421)
(1.002) (0.046)
5.251*** -1.299*** 1.987*** 3.37 (p = 0.498)
(0.946) (0.314) (0.319)
4.997*** 0.448*** 0.758*** 0.469*** 5.758 (p = 0.451)
(1.121) (0.147) (0.176) (0.101)
5.639*** -1.474* 0.633*** 0.481*** 1.759*** 6.525 (p = 0.589)
(0.644) (0.796) (0.205) (0.139) (0.643)
Jan 1971-Aug 2001 5.99*** 0.535*** 1.842 (p = 0.398)
(Before 9/11/01) (1.849) (0.061)
5.741*** -1.499*** 2.09*** 2.935 (p = 0.569)
(1.671) (0.297) (0.279)
5.489*** 0.635** 1.007*** 0.578*** 4.471 (p = 0.613)
(1.995) (0.281) (0.323) (0.115)
6.635*** -1.459 0.714** 0.549 1.74 4.975 (p = 0.76)
(1.332) (1.37) (0.288) (0.488) (1.073)
Oct 2001-Dec 2010 0.185 0.783*** 0.137 (p = 0.934)
(After 9/11/01) (0.355) (0.036)
0.202 0.309 0.43* 0.615 (p = 0.961)
(0.33) (0.217) (0.257)
0.419 0.275*** 0.246*** 0.294*** 3.915 (p = 0.688)
(0.295) (0.091 (0.095) (0.114)
0.616** -0.899*** 0.492*** 0.333*** 0.995*** 4.027 (p = 0.855)
(0.308) (0.261) (0.101) (0.083) (0.237)
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis below GMM regression estimates. ***significance at the 1% level, **significance at the 5% level,
*significance at the 10% level. Terrorism index calculated using data obtained from the Global Terrorism Database. 100 portfolios and Fama-
French factors obtained from Kenneth R. French’s website.
The inconsistent results between the portfolios is intriguing. It is possible that industry port-
folios are not as affected by terrorism risk as those organized based on size and book-to-market
equity? Since we are analyzing terror as a type of political uncertainty, its affect on portfolios
should be systematic. It is also possible that the smaller set of testing portfolios suffers from the
small sample bias of the second method of estimation, GMM. This dilemma provides the mo-
tivation for Chapter 4. But without a more persuasive argument, there is nothing more than an
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inconclusive result for the data segregation.
2.6 The Determinants of Terrorism
In this section I analyze the effects of macroeconomic variables on the act of terror. The discovery
of relevant economic and social variables on the incidence of terrorism compounds the argument
that terrorism is indicative of a deeper shift in the economic fundamentals and thus a source of
political uncertainty. And perhaps the inclusion of such relevant variables in asset pricing models
can mitigate future risk.
Previous research on the determinants of terrorism, or what makes a country more susceptible
to experience a terror attack, has been limited mostly due to a lack of quality data and estimation
techniques. In Tavares (2004), not only are the effects of terrorism analyzed, but Tavares also dis-
covers that richer countries are more likely to suffer from terror attacks, although democracies are
less likely. Abadie (2006) disagrees, noting that richer countries are no more likely than poorer
countries to experience a terror attack if they maintain the same level of civil liberties and democ-
racy. Both empirical analyses utilize ordinary least squares regression, but Piazza (2006) supports
the findings of Abadie (2006) using the multiple regression technique. Piazza further suggests that
social variables have much more influence on terrorism than economic variables.
To account for the relative differences in the effect of country level income on terrorist activity,
Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana (2004) and Blomberg and Hess (2008a) split the data into sub-
categories: high income and low income countries. The results are markedly different for each
group, with per capita income increasing the incidence of terrorism for the higher income coun-
tries and lowering it for lower income countries. (Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana (2004) use a
markov process in their investigation whereas Blomberg and Hess (2008a) use a panel estimation
technique).
The most recent empirical investigations into the determinants of terror events rely on panel
estimation techniques. Using negative binomial fixed effects regression, Caruso and Schneider
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(2011) determine that social welfare variables, specifically those related to current economic op-
portunities, lower the incidence of terrorism, although real GDP is positively associated with ter-
rorist brutality. Kis-Katos, Liebert, and Schulze (2011) also use negative binomial fixed effects
regression and they determine that terror increases with income and democracy.
In an effort to reconcile the various disagreements on the effect of country income, political
rights, and the level of democracy of a country, I focus on these variables hypothesizing that all
three have a negative effect on the number of terror attacks. I further hypothesize that income
disparity contributes positively to terror activity. Using data provided by the START program, I
perform analysis on a time series of annual, country-level terrorist events spanning eighteen years
and 148 countries. Since it is possible that a high amount of domestic terrorism influences gross
domestic product, even in the short-run (see Tavares (2004), Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008), and
Llussá and Tavares (2011)), I consider this variable endogenous in my analysis. Per the use of
cross-sectional time series, an endogenous income variable, and time-invariant geographic vari-
ables, Hausman Taylor estimation is appropriate.
Surprisingly, I discover counterintuitive results. First, I show that wealth does not contribute to
terrorist activity while country size and location do. Terrorism also decreases with population and
education levels but increases with a decrease in civil liberties. This research differs from previous,
particularly Caruso and Schneider (2011) and Kis-Katos, Liebert, and Schulze (2011), in the use of
the Hausman Taylor panel estimation technique and the simultaneous incorporation of endogenous
and geographic variables with a slightly different outcome.
2.6.1 Explanatory Variables
Many of the explanatory variables are obtained from the World Bank website (WDI (2012)). To
understand the effect of country income on the number of terror events, I utilize GDP per capita
(in current US dollars). High inflation and unemployment is often associated with higher crime
rates and has previously been shown to be positively associated with terrorist events (see Gold-
stein (2006), Piazza (2006), and Caruso and Schneider (2011)). So I include total unemployment
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(as a percentage of the total labor force) and the GDP deflator as a measure of inflation (annual
percentage).
To expand further on the effect of income on terrorism, I hypothesize that income distribution
influences terror activity. I test if disproportionate income distribution and relative poverty have a
significant effect on the number of terror events by using the Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient
measures the extent of the distribution of wealth using an index ranging from 0 to 100. A Gini
index of ‘0’ represents perfect equality but an index of ‘100’ is perfect inequality. Other social
variables include population (total), general education level (gross percentage of age-appropriate
enrolled in secondary education), and a measure of civil liberties (see Krueger and Malec̆ková
(2003) for details on the contribution of education).
Previous literature suggests that the amount of civil liberties, and the subsequent response
of government to the desires of the constituents, contributes to the incidence of terrorism (see
Abadie (2006), Piazza (2006), Blomberg and Hess (2008a), Kis-Katos et al (2011), and Caruso
and Schneider (2011)). Variables that account for political rights and the level of democracy are
often utilized, though controversial in their abilities to accurately measure freedom and government
interaction. I choose to utilize the civil liberties index from Freedom House as the democracy
variable in this analysis (PR (2011)). The index assigns a value from 1 to 7 with the lower end
of the scale representing the highest degree of freedom (for example, the United States scores a 1
throughout).
The final set of independent variables are geographic. Abadie (2006) and Blomberg and Hess
(2008a) suggest that the location of a country contributes to terrorist activity, with the more iso-
lated countries experiencing less terrorism. I employ the same geographic variables utilized by
Abadie (2006), which were obtained from John Luke Gallup’s website (Gallup, Mellinger, and
Sachs (1999) and Gallup (2011)). The geographic variables include country land area (km2), mean
elevation (meters above sea level), and mean distance to the nearest coastline or sea-navigable river
(km).
It has been suggested that the use of social variables that account for ethnic, linguistic, and
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religious differences be utilized in the estimation on the determinants of terror (Piazza (2006) and
Burgoon (2011)). However, there does not exist a single diversity index that is without contro-
versy. Property rights and law enforcement has also historically contributed to terrorism on an
international level (De Soto (1989)). But property rights is another controversial variable that is
not regularly utilized in macroeconomic or panel investigations. Further this endeavor is, primar-
ily, a look at terrorism as a market risk factor. The search for the economic determinants of terror
is simply an obvious extension of an analysis on the contributors to political risk. The search for a
full list of determinants is a subject for future pursuits and not the original purpose of this chapter.
So for this reason, I choose to relegate the determinants analysis to those socioeconomic variables
already listed.
2.6.2 Methodology
Unlike standard time-series or cross-sectional datasets for which we can use ordinary least squares
estimation, panel data consists of both N cross-sectional units with fewer time T observations.
Consider the model
yit = α + x′itβ +uit
where t denotes time, t = 1, . . . ,T , and i represents the cross-sectional units which can be firms,
countries, etc, i = 1, . . . ,N (Baltagi 2008). So xit is the itth observation on K explanatory variables.
The disturbances, uit , maintain a one-way error component, uit = µi + vit , where µi denotes the
unobservable, individual specific trait that is time-invariant and vit is the remainder disturbance.
These individual effects are the reason we cannot use standard OLS regression in panel data-the
individual effects act as separate intercept terms for each cross-sectional unit and simply elimi-
nating this variable from the model will yield biased estimators, the result of running a regression
with missing variables when the true model contains them.
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2.6.2.1 Hausman Taylor Estimation
Fixed effects regression, generally considered the standard estimation technique for panel data
analysis, assumes that there is no correlation between the explanatory variables and the individual
effects. Hausman Taylor estimation, on the other hand, works under the assumption that some of
the explanatory variables are endogenous while the rest are exogenous and splits the data as such.
Consider the model
yit = α + x′itβ + z
′
iγ +µi + vit
where i = 1, . . . ,N, t = 1, . . . ,T , and zi are cross-sectional, time-invariant parameters, like gender
for example, that are separate from µi, which is more like individual talent. In matrix form,
y = Xβ +Zγ +Zµ µ +ν
where X = (R1
... R2), Z = (S1
... S2). Hausman Taylor further assumes that R1 and S1 are exogenous
or predetermined and R2 and S2 are endogenous, or E[µ|R1,S1] = 0, E[µ|R2,S2] 6= 0.
Now, since some of the variables are endogenous, we cannot use least squares estimation tech-
niques without encountering problems of parameter consistency. So Hausman Taylor estimation
works by using the instrumental variables technique. Here, we use the exogenous variables as
instruments for the endogenous variables: R1 and S1 are instruments for themselves, while PR1 is
the instrument for S2, where P = Zµ(Z′µZµ)
−1Z′µ , and QR2 is the instrument for R2, where Q is the
residual maker. So the final instrument matrix is
[R1
...QR2
...S1
...PR1].
2.6.3 Empirical Results
Using data on 148 countries from 1990-2008, I investigate the following model:
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lnTerrorEventsit = µi+β1lnGDPPCit +β2GDPde f lit +β3Unempit +β4lnPopit +β5GINIit+
β6Educationit +β7CivLibit +β8lnLandAreai+β9lnElevationi+β10lnDistancei+
νit
where i = 1, . . . ,148, t = 1, . . . ,19 and
lnTerrorEvents = log number terror events lnGDPPC = log GDP per capita
GDPdefl = GDP deflator/1000 Unemp = total unemployed(%)
lnPop = log total population GINI = Gini coefficient(0-100)
Education = high school enrollment(%) CivLib = civil liberties index(1-7)
lnLandArea = log land area lnElevation = log elevation(mean)
lnDistance = log distance to waterway
Once again, the only endogenous variable I utilize is the income variable, GDP per capita.
2.6.3.1 Summary Statistics
The summary statistics are reported in Table 2.6. The average annual number of terror events is
15.2 between 148 countries in 13 regions around the world (see Appendix A for further details on
region and country-level statistics). But the data does maintain a large standard deviation at 59.5
events. Of course, the number of events can never be negative so the minimum number of events
is 0. And the highest number of terror events in one year was 1104 which occurred in Iraq in 2005.
2.6.3.2 Hausman Taylor Estimation
In Table 2.7, you will find the results for Hausman Taylor estimation along with ordinary least
squares regression and fixed effects estimation for comparison. The OLS regression results support
those in Abadie (2006). Country level income has no statistically significant effect on terrorism,
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while some of the geographic variables do. Interestingly, both the Gini coefficient, which repre-
sents income disparity, and the civil liberties index do not contribute to terrorism. The constant
term is also inexplicably negative representing a negative amount of terrorism on average for each
country regardless of socioeconomic status.
Table 2.6: Summary Statistics for the Terror Events Panel
Time Period 1990:2008
Number of Regions 13
Number of Countries 148
Total Number of Events 42755
Mean Events per Year 15.204
Standard Deviation 59.479
Minimum 0
Maximum 1104
Fixed effects estimation confirms the OLS results regarding income and the Gini coefficient.
But results that differ include the employment, population, and education variables. Unemploy-
ment and education both lose their affect on terrorist activity while a larger population experiences
less terrorism. This outcome is rather counterintuitive. But notice the democracy variable–a de-
crease in civil liberties increases terror. Once again, on a scale from 1-7, 1 represents the highest
level of liberty. The constant term is also quite large at 37.8 events. Fixed effects regression will not
estimate parameters for time-invariant variables so there are no results to report for the geographic
variables.
The final column in Table 2.7 contains the results of the Hausman Taylor estimation method.
According to the Hausman Taylor results, country wealth does not contribute to terrorism, neither
do employment rates nor income disparity. Similar to the fixed effects estimation, a larger pop-
ulation decreases the incidence of terrorism, as does education, with a slightly smaller effect for
both. A decrease in civil liberties results in more terrorism. Notice also that both land area and the
distance to nearest coastline or sea-navigable river are both significantly contributing variables. A
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larger country tends to experience more terrorism, but the further away from a major waterway the
less terror. This suggests that landlock has a negative impact on terrorism. The Hausman model
further indicates an insignificant constant term. This could mean that without these parameters
present, the country is likely not to experience terrorism.
Table 2.7: Parameter Estimates for the Determinants of Terrorism
Ordinary Least Fixed Effects Hausman Taylor
Variable Squares Estimation Estimation Estimation
GDP Per Capita 0.013 0.086 -0.094
(Endogenous) (0.31) (0.85) (-1.06)
GDP Deflator 0.345*** 0.206*** 0.205***
(3.37) (2.54) (2.61)
Unemployment Rate 0.047*** -0.008 -0.008
(6.17) (-0.94) (-1.05)
Population 0.511*** -2.247*** -0.691***
(13.65) (-6.21) (-3.02)
Secondary Enrollment -0.004*** -0.002 -0.002**
(-3.38) (-1.35) (-1.97)
Gini Coefficient -0.001 -0.003 -0.003
(-0.64) (-1.33) (-1.37)
Civil Liberties Index 0.055 0.349*** 0.367***
(1.57) (6.37) (7.03)
Land Area -0.151*** 0.878***
(-3.58) (2.81)
Elevation 0.194*** 0.482
(3.81) (1.1)
Distance to Waterway -0.089 -0.993**
(-1.55) (-2.27)
Constant -5.776*** 37.766*** 3.465
(-10.03) (6.54) (0.84)
t-statistics are reported in parenthesis below OLS and FE regression estimates. z-statistics are reported for HT regression estimates. ***significance
at the 1% level, **significance at the 5% level, *significance at the 10% level. Terrorism data obtained from the Global Terrorism Database, civil
liberties index obtained from Freedom House, and geographic variables obtained from John Luke Gallup’s website. All other variables are obtained
from World Bank.
To test the validity of the Hausman Taylor model, I use both the Breusch-Pagan test and the
Hausman test. The Breusch-Pagan test in Table 2.8 indicates that panel estimation is preferred to
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ordinary least squares estimation. And the Hausman test further concludes that Hausman Taylor
estimation is preferred to fixed effects regression.
Table 2.8: Data Testing
Test Statistic P-Value
Breusch-Pagan 1567.96 0.000
(Panel Data)
Hausman 33.88 0.000
(Fixed Effects vs Hausman Taylor)
2.7 Conclusion
It has been argued that terrorism is suggestive of alterations in the deeper economic fundamen-
tals and thus representative of greater political risk, so it is in this context that I analyze terror.
According to both cross-sectional regression analysis and generalized method of moments esti-
mation techniques, terrorism risk is systematic and priced in the American financial market from
January 1971 to December 2010 for nonindustry returns. This conflicts with previous research
which uncovers the effects of terror reflected in industry returns (Choudry (2005) and Berrebi and
Klor (2010)). Results further contrast when the data is separated into time periods before and
after September 11, 2001. The lack of terrorism risk in the latter period suggests either measure-
ment error of the terrorism index, incorrect assessment method, or both. Suggestions for future
research include alternative measures of the terrorism index and the use of time-varying betas and
conditional linear factor models in analysis.
In terms of the contributors to terror, I have determined that social parameters like education
and democracy variables contribute more to terror than economic variables like income and em-
ployment rates. I further determined that the geographic location of a country positively contributes
to terrorism. If terrorism is in fact suggestive of underlying political unrest, then examination of
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the determinants of terrorism is important because it is another means by which to mitigate fu-
ture terror attack risk. Another avenue for future research is the discovery of the complete list of
terrorism determinants and the incorporation of the contributing socioeconomic variables in asset
pricing models.
Now, the outcome concerning risk premium in time period after 9/11 suggests that the number
of terrorist attacks may no longer be a concern in the American financial sector. So is terrorism
risk, and subsequently political risk, unnecessary in the pricing of financial assets? Or are investors
just less afraid of terrorism since the epic attacks on the World Trade Center? One answer is, yes,
investors are less afraid in the time since September 11, 2001 now that there is more awareness and
policing of terror activity than in previous decades. On the 10th anniversary of September 11th,
USA Today announced recent findings of its Gallup poll demonstrating a ten year low in American
fear of an impending terrorist attack, but with little explanation as to why (Saad (2011)). While
Americans are less concerned with terrorism, it is not due to an overconfidence in the protection
provided by the American government. The Gallup poll further indicates that confidence in the
Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and State is not as great as it was in the time just
after 9/11.
A second possibility is that with the increased, widespread attentiveness to terrorism and terror
activity, investors are not so startled by the sheer number of domestic terror events but rather the
national importance of individual events, such as September 11th itself. In 2009, the Washington
Times published an article stating that the events of September 11th, 2001 while tragic, is only
one of more than 1,000 events in the U.S. since the 1970s, which is supported by the GTD data
(see Harper (2009) and GTD (2011)). The author suggests that the reaction to the event, the public
perception and the stress and anxiety induced, has more of an effect on the national opinion of
what constitutes terrorism and not necessarily the number of events. So perhaps this particular
measure of terrorism risk in the time after September 11th is inaccurate. A measure that employs
the significance of individual events or the effects of terrorism could yield interesting results.
A proper mimicking portfolio might also be an avenue for further inspection. Mimicking port-
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folios have been shown to perform better in financial analysis than nontraded factors, so the cre-
ation of a portfolio that mimics for terrorism risk using stock returns might yield even more inter-
esting results (Balduzzi and Robotti (2008), Balduzzi and Robotti (2009), and Hou and Kimmel
(2006)). Using the S&P 500, Karloyi (2007) develops his own set of “terrorism portfolios" and
uses them to derive two terrorism-related investment strategies: the first is a portfolio of S&P 500
stocks assembled based on terrorism risk scores and the second are terrorism-related risk exposure
portfolios. Both of these could be used as a stand-in for terrorism risk and the application is an
avenue for future research.
Now, though results are inconclusive between the portfolio sets, this does not indicate that
general political risk does not contribute to the price of stock returns. Terrorism risk is only one
measure of political uncertainty. Further research and alternative measures of political risk, like the
political regime change variable utilized in Chapter 3, are required before making that conclusion.
The use of inappropriate estimation techniques for smaller samples could bias the data. That topic
is also investigated further in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 3
Political Risk: Estimating the Risk
Premium of Political Regime Change
3.1 Introduction
A recent article by David Leonard of the New York Times suggests that the outcome of this year’s
presidential election would be dependent on the state of the economy (Leonard (2012)). According
to the article, the most significant influence, historically, on American voters is the economic
outlook. There is a longstanding relationship between politics and the economy. There is also a
longstanding relationship between politics and the financial markets. On March 5, 2012, the Wall
Street Journal published an article indicating that during presidential election years, the Dow Jones
Industrial Average dips in the months preceding the election but rebalances once the election is
over (Browning (2012)). This would suggest that uncertainty over the outcome of the election has
a negative effect on investment, but once that uncertainty is mitigated, investors begin to reinvest.
Political uncertainty, or the uncertainty over the unknown costs of political events, decisions,
and actions, is the result of changes in political policies and government leadership. The uncer-
tainty induced from upcoming political events, such as elections, and its relationship with invest-
ment and the market has been investigated in Durnev (2011) and Julio and Yook (2012). In Durnev
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(2011), analysis is performed on a large, international panel of elections and stock prices. The
author concludes that investment is less sensitive to stock prices during election years due to nois-
ier signals. Julio and Yook (2012) note a decrease in investment during election years, finding
evidence to support the hypothesis that political uncertainty causes firms to reduce investment un-
til electoral outcomes become known. Also in a panel investigation, Pantzalis, Strangeland, and
Turtle (2000) find abnormal, positive returns in the two weeks prior to elections. And Born and
Li (2007) support their hypothesis that uncertainty about U.S. presidential elections is reflected in
pre-election common stocks. They further indicate that if there is no dominant candidate, stock
market volatility and average returns rise.
Return volatility is investigated in Boutchkova, Dosh, Durnev, and Molchanov (2012). They
determine a relationship between industry return volatilities, trade, and political uncertainty. The
authors reason that those industries dependent on trade experience increased volatility when po-
litical risks are higher. They further suggest that while systematic volatility is associated with
domestic uncertainty, global uncertainty is associated with idiosyncratic volatility and can thus be
diversified even though this may not be necessary. Incidentally, the connection between various
political policies, specifically tax policies, and trade has been investigated in papers like Handley
and Limão (2012) where political uncertainty affects the firm’s decision to enter into international
trade.
But the question remains, does political risk, the uncertainty about the ramifications of pos-
sible government actions and policies, have a direct effect on asset prices? This paper examines
that very question. I hypothesize that political risk is a contributing risk factor in the pricing of
securities. I price this factor by first creating a variable that proxies for political risk and then
perform cross-sectional and nonlinear regression estimation to examine the risk premium incurred.
In general, few factors have been accepted as having an effect on asset prices wherein investors
require compensation for holding securities that contain this risk. This investigation supports the
argument that political risk is an important factor that cannot be overlooked in the pricing of as-
sets. This is the first empirical exercise using standard multifactor asset pricing models to confirm
34
the significance of political risk. My contribution also includes affirmation that average returns in
excess of the risk-free rate are higher under a Democratic regime than a Republican regime.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to measure political risk. While uncertainty about particular
government policies and the related costs are not easy to quantify, it is possible to measure political
regime change. Though we cannot be certain which policies will be chosen nor the political costs
of those policies, if we learn which regime is in control of the government at the time of the policy
change, we will have some indication as to what type of policy is more likely and thus what type
of costs to anticipate. If regime change is indeed a source of insecurity amongst investors, then
there must be some empirical evidence to support the added risk of this uncertainty.
Within the United States, there are essentially two dominant political parties, Democrat and
Republican, each with its own set of political agendas and general policies. To assess the effects of
political regime change, I first examine the average excess returns of 25 portfolios organized based
on size and book-equity to market-equity and 49 industry portfolios when the federal government
is under the control of each respective political party. Analyses suggests that average excess returns
are higher under a Democratic regime than a Republican regime.
While regime change might explain the variation in assets over time, it does not yet explain the
cross section of returns. I create a dummy variable that represents the switching of regime from
Democratic control of government to Republican and use it to analyze the cross sections of assets.
I use both cross-sectional and multivariate nonlinear regression to estimate the risk premium of
political regime change. Using monthly excess returns, I find that the risk premium is positively
priced and in the case of the 25 portfolios, it accounts for the variation in returns along with the
Fama-French factors (Fama and French (1993)). In the case of the 49 industry portfolios, political
risk is the only factor that maintains a risk premium and is thus the only factor that explains the
variation in excess returns.
35
3.2 Related Literature
To my knowledge there are just two papers, both by L̆ubos̆ Pástor and Pietro Veronesi, that address
the measurement of political uncertainty theoretically. In both, the authors produce a general
equilibrium model of government policy using the price of political risk, however, the models
differ in their use of homogenous and heterogenous government policies. In Pástor and Veronesi
(2012), the authors use homogenous policies and find that the model indicates a decrease in stock
prices after the announcement of a policy change. The magnitude of this decrease is large if the
uncertainty about the government policy is large. Policy changes also increase the volatilities and
correlations of stocks, and the jump risk premium, or the jump in stock prices on the date of the
policy change announcement, should be positive. The results in Pástor and Veronesi (2011) are
similar, however, the government policies are heterogenous.
The model in Pástor and Veronesi (2011) specifies that stock prices are driven by three types
of shocks: capital shocks, impact shocks, and political shocks. The first two shocks are referred to
as economic shocks and they are driven by shocks to aggregate capital. The last shock, political
shocks, are orthogonal to economic shocks and thus command their own risk premium. Political
shocks are the result of learning about political costs, the uncertainty of which Pástor and Veronesi
refer to as political uncertainty, of prospective policies. The shocks reflect the flow of news about
the various government policies, which in turn leads investors to modify their beliefs about the
likelihoods of the policies. Through simulations, the authors determine that the political risk pre-
mium is larger in a weaker economy and directly contributes to the jump risk premium at the time
of the policy change announcement, which is generally positive.
While Pástor and Veronesi (2011) and Pástor and Veronesi (2012) both introduce a model that
suggests that political risk is indeed a priced risk factor, the literature on political cycles does not
necessarily corroborate this suggestion. Using a time series of excess returns, Huang (1985) and
Santa Clara and Valkanov (2003) find that there is a difference in the averages contingent upon
the administrating party in the White House, often referred to as the partisan cycle. Democratic
presidencies yield higher than average excess returns when compared to Republican presidencies.
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In Huang (1985), the author examines stock returns over the four-year election cycle, discovering
that returns are smaller in the first two years than in years three and four. Huang suggests a risk
hedging mechanism, investing only in treasuries during cycle years one and two of a Republican
administration. But he stops short of estimating a risk premium. Santa Clara and Valkanov (2003)
corroborate the results of Huang (1985) but attribute the higher average returns to business cycle
fluctuations. They further propose that increased return volatilities under the Republican presiden-
cies indicates no evidence for a Democratic risk premium.
These arguments are further expanded by Belo, Gala, and Li (2012). They discover that indus-
tries with amplified exposure to government spending experience higher average returns during a
Democratic presidency. The authors construct a new measure of industry exposure to government
spending using data on input-output accounts. Unconditionally, there is no difference in average
returns with heterogenous exposure, however, there is variation in the averages conditional on
the presidential partisan cycle. Additionally, by constructing an investment strategy based on the
partisan cycle, they discover that the differences in return levels is due to abnormal returns.
This research is similar to the previous research in that I search for a connection between
political risk and asset pricing, finding a relationship between the controlling political party and
average excess returns. I generally confirm the results of Pástor and Veronesi (2011) by finding a
positive relationship between political uncertainty and assets. But unlike both Pástor and Veronesi
articles, which are highly theoretical, I formulate an empirical measure of political risk and test it
using a standard multifactor asset pricing model.
I confirm the results of Belo, Gala, and Li (2012), Huang (1985), and Santa Clara and Valkanov
(2003) by determining that average excess returns are greater under a Democratic presidency than
a Republican, but I supplement these results using a measure of both the executive and legislative
branches of government with not only industry portfolios but common stock returns organized
based on size and book-to-market equity and not government exposure. I do not focus on the
business or partisan cycle. Belo, Gala, and Li (2012) emphasize the role of exposure to government
spending in predicting the cross section of returns exploiting the predictability of a presidential
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partisan cycle investment strategy. But unlike this endeavor, the authors do not price political risk
in a linear factor model as I do. I hypothesize that political risk is priced and I discover a risk
premium that is positive and significant. While my results differ empirically from those of the
three preceding articles, they provide the motivation for this study.
The greater difference between this endeavor and the previous empirical research is the as-
sessment of political uncertainty. All three papers would suggest that because Democratic admin-
istrations experience larger excess returns over Republican administrations that stock returns are
riskier under this regime and safer under the other. This is not the suggestion of this paper. I do not
seek to discover the “Democratic risk premium". My hypothesis is in agreement with Pástor and
Veronesi (2011), the political uncertainty to assess is the uncertainty of the future unknown costs of
the relevant political policies and their affects on security returns. So in the next section, I capture
political risk by indexing political regime change. While we cannot be certain about what policy
will be chosen nor what the costs of those policies will be, if we learn which regime, or political
party, is in control of the government at the time of the policy change, we have some indication
of what type of policy is more likely and thus what political costs to anticipate. This serves as the
measure of political risk throughout this empirical exercise.
3.3 Average Excess Returns and Regime Switching
In order to create the political regime change variable, which I use as a proxy for political risk,
I must first assess if there is indeed a difference in the average excess returns under each regime.
Arguably, any difference could be attributed to concerns over the proposed policies and subsequent
costs of the dominating party. For this part, I focus on the American political system, particularly,
the predominant two-party system that the United States maintains and their control of the lawmak-
ing branches of the government. I hypothesize that there is a difference in average excess returns
under the governmental control of the two political parties, Democrat and Republican, with previ-
ous research indicating higher averages under the Democratic regime (Santa Clara and Valkonov
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(2003)).
3.3.1 Analysis: Democrat versus Republican
Within the United States there are three branches of government: the executive branch, the leg-
islative branch, and the judicial branch. While the judicial branch created and maintains the court
system and is considered the law-enforcing portion of the federal government, it is not a lawmak-
ing branch of government. So I focus my analysis on those two branches that are legislative as
political influence on these branches directly influences the laws and policies that are created.
The other two branches of the government, the executive and legislative branches, are both
lawmaking branches although their functions in the legislating process are quite different. The
executive branch consists of the White House which is controlled by the President and his cabinet.
The legislative branch, or Congress, consists of two houses, the Senate and the House of Rep-
resentatives, comprised of members elected by the American public (currently 100 senators, two
from each state, and 435 representatives, the number of which depends on the population of the
individual state). Unlike the White House, neither house is controlled by any individual member
but rather a ruling majority. Obviously, each of the three houses, the White House, the Senate, and
the House of Representatives, is directly influenced by the political party of the ruling majority.
In the case of the White House, the President’s political party will have amplified influence on the
entire executive branch.
I obtain presidential and congressional data from 1927 through 2009 (see About.com (2012)
and Infoplease (2012)). In order to analyze the differences in average excess returns based on party
control, I employ the definition of party control as “majority vote" or the party that sustains the
majority of members within the house. For the most part, majority vote consists of the party with
more than 50% of the seats, but for a few years, majority vote was either at or below 50%. Of
course, control of the White House belongs to the party with whom the President is affiliated.
For the testing assets, I use the 25 portfolios, 49 industry portfolios, and the excess market
return obtained from Kenneth R. French’s data library (French(2012)). The 25 portfolios are as-
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sembled at the end of June and consists of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stock returns. They are
formed by the intersections of five portfolios generated based on size and five portfolios generated
based on book-to-market equity. The 49 industry portfolios are created due to the assignment of
each stock to an industry using its Compustat SIC code. They are unorganized and I exclude in-
dustries 3, 11, 15, 20, 26, 27, 36, and 39 from the analysis for a lack of historical data. I use these
portfolios because of their accessibility and portfolio organization, both useful characteristics for
econometric analysis later on. For each set of portfolios, I calculate the excess returns (the portfolio
return in excess of the risk-free rate) and analyze the averages using monthly and annual data.
I use three categories to analyze the extent of each party’s control of the federal government:
the executive branch (the White House), the legislative branch (both the Senate and the House
of Representatives), and both branches (the White House and at least one house of Congress).
With these categories, there is some amount of overlap in the years utilized because the year of
control is counted regardless of which party is in control of the other houses. Now, while the
Democrats controlled the executive branch for about the same length of time as the Republicans,
the Democrats controlled the legislative branch for about twice as long as the Republicans and ten
years longer for both branches (for details, see Appendix B).
I calculate average excess returns and other relevant statistics during each regime’s control of
the relevant branch in Table 3.1 (also see Appendix B for detailed statistics). In all three cases,
the Democratic Party sees significantly higher than population average excess returns while the
Republican Party sees lower than average. Incidentally, the Democratic Party’s returns are at least
twice the size of the Republican returns. Particularly, when the Democrats control both branches,
the average annual returns for the 25 portfolios are around 20%, but when the Republicans control
the government averages are just under 3%. Both are significantly different from the population
average for the 25 portfolios for the length of the sample.
Interestingly, while the average excess returns for the 49 industry portfolios are always smaller
than the average returns for the 25 portfolios when the Democrats are in control, the average ex-
cess returns for both sets of portfolios are much closer under Republican control. This speaks
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to the Republican Party’s well-known platform that supports industry, small-business, and private
investment over government spending. However, all of the earlier results reject the popular no-
tion that average excess returns are better under a Republican administration than a Democratic
administration.
Table 3.1: Average Excess Returns Under Regime Control
Executive Branch Legislative Branch Both Branches
Democrat Avg Return Variance Avg Return Variance Avg Return Variance
Annual
25 Portfolios 18.324 887.852 13.752 986.402 20.321 1011.864
49 Industry 15.211 907.083 11.598 972.886 16.563 992.527
Mkt Return 12.822 331.884 9.089 419.484 13.005 363.21
Monthly
25 Portfolios 1.445 67.474 1.035 59.354 1.593 75.727
49 Industry 1.172 56.702 0.852 53.903 1.269 60.587
Mkt Return 1.015 27.461 0.698 26.573 1.032 29.387
Republican
Annual
25 Portfolios 4.462 850.59 5.796 869.257 2.744 921.953
49 Industry 4.407 933.318 5.826 1002.502 2.73 1060.954
Mkt Return 3.142 514.531 5.744 584.379 1.09 623.595
Monthly
25 Portfolios 0.211 66.667 0.315 99.441 0.032 97.363
49 Industry 0.259 60.454 0.396 77.8 0.11 78.208
Mkt Return 0.214 32.218 0.437 41.813 0.048 42.532
The average excess market return is usually never significantly different from the population
average at more than the 10% level, but it is a good indication of how the market in general
performed during each administration. It follows the same pattern as the 25 portfolios and the 49
industry portfolios. Return volatilities are also about the same regardless of regime control, with
Republican control just slightly higher.
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3.3.2 Political Regime Change
There does seem to be some truth to regime change and its effect on average excess returns. The
inference is that the regime changing reflects the uncertainty investors feel regarding the outcome
of elections (and subsequently future political actions and decisions), more specifically, whether
Democrats will control the federal government or the Republicans. To account for the regime
changing, I create a dummy variable marking ‘1’ for the years the Republicans control the govern-
ment, in this case two or more of the three lawmaking houses (the White House, the Senate, or the
House of Representatives), and ‘0’ otherwise, corresponding to Democrat control of two or more
houses.
After creating the dummy variable for the entire length of the time series, I want to examine av-
erage excess returns once again, to ensure that the differences between the two regimes is captured
by the new variable. By definition, it is not possible for both parties to control the government
simultaneously, so there is no overlap in time periods. Republicans control the government for
29 years of the series and Democrats control for 54 years (see Appendix C). Once again, the 25
portfolios, 49 industry, and the market return are utilized on annual and monthly excess returns.
The results in Table 3.2 are similar to the previous section, however, the difference in average
excess returns is not quite as large as before. But the relationship is maintained–Democrats see
higher than average excess returns and Republicans see lower than average. Volatilities are about
the same as before.
It is apparent that the new dummy variable, which I now refer to as the regime change dummy,
does a good job capturing the relationship between the averages under the respective regimes.
Now, average excess returns indicate an interesting result, that the stock market is better off with
a Democratic government than a Republican government. This is true under a time series of 25
portfolios, 49 industry portfolios, and the market return. But does regime change uncertainty also
affect the cross section of returns? Does the regime change dummy account for the variation
across assets as well as it does for the time series? Before we can conclude that regime change is
an appropriate proxy for political risk and is thus a priced risk factor in asset pricing, we must first
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analyze its effect on the cross section of security returns.
Table 3.2: Average Excess Returns Under the Regime Change Dummy Variable
Democrat(0)
Annual Average Return Variance
25 Portfolios 14.111 997.127
49 Industry 11.927 983.341
Mkt Return 9.343 423.761
Monthly
25 Portfolios 1.062 60.23
49 Industry 0.876 54.563
Mkt Return 0.717 26.899
Republican(1)
Annual
25 Portfolios 6.092 726.012
49 Industry 5.679 861.188
Mkt Return 5.281 483.728
Monthly
25 Portfolios 0.371 80.575
49 Industry 0.401 66.567
Mkt Return 0.41 35.803
3.4 Methodology
Consider the basic pricing formula, pt = E[mt+1xt+1] or equivalently 1 = E[mt+1,Rt+1] where
Rt+1 =
xt+1
pt
are gross returns on assets (Cochrane (2005)). Asset pricing models usually only differ
in their interpretation of the stochastic discount factor, mt+1. An important class of asset pricing
models is the linear factor model, or the linear beta pricing mode, which interprets the stochastic
discount factor as a linear combination of various pervasive risk factors in the form of m = b0−
f ′b1 (in this example, I use a single factor and I eliminate the time subscripts for simplicity). It
can be shown that the linear beta restriction is equivalent to the linear stochastic discount factor
assumption (Cochrane (2005)). Excess returns can also be used in place of gross returns to simplify
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analysis, but the use of excess returns requires slightly different initial assumptions: m = 1−b( f −
E[ f ]) (see Chapter 4 for further details). To test whether political regime change risk accounts for
the variation in the cross section of asset returns, I utilize excess returns in standard linear factor
asset pricing model.
Denote by Rt a vector of returns in excess of the risk free rate on N assets at time t and ft as
the vector of K economy-wide factors at time t. Now assume that returns follow the linear process
Ri,t = αi + f ′t βi +ui,t , i = 1, . . . ,N, t = 1, . . . ,T (3.1)
where the errors ui,t are uncorrelated with the factors for all i with mean zero and βi is the vector
of betas, or factor loadings, for asset i which is given by
βi = E[( ft−E[ ft ])( ft−E[ ft ])′]−1E[(Ri,t−E[Ri,t ])( ft−E[ ft ])], (3.2a)
ΣR = E[(Ri,t−E[Ri,t ])(Ri,t−E[Ri,t ])′], (3.2b)
Σ f = E[( ft−E[ ft ])( ft−E[ ft ])′]. (3.2c)
Under these assumptions, the linear beta pricing model places the restriction
E[Ri,t ] = a0 +λ ′βi, i = 1, . . . ,N (3.3)
where λ is the vector of risk premia and a0 is a vector of constants (see Jagannathan, Schaumburg,
and Zhou (2010)). Another way to interpret the two equations above is to consider the factor
loadings, βi, as the relationship between the risk factors, ft , and the returns, Rt . Then λ can be
interpreted as the price of risk or the amount of compensation that investors require for holding
onto assets with the risk factors present. If λ is positive and significant, then we would say that the
factor is priced because it does explain the variation in the cross section of asset prices.
Classic articles by Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986) and Fama and French (1993) use linear fac-
tor models to explain the cross sections of assets, each with their own risk factors. While Chen,
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Roll, and Ross use macroeconomic variables in their analysis, Fama and French create mimicking
portfolios that capture the pervasive risks presented by firm characteristics such as firm size and
book-to-market effects. Along with these two factors, Fama and French also use the market port-
folio in excess of the risk-free rate to create the Fama-French factors which are now commonly
used in empirical studies as they do indeed account for much of the variation in the cross section
of security returns.
3.4.1 Cross-Sectional Regression
There are several methods to evaluate linear factor models, two of which I employ in this empirical
investigation (I follow the notation of Jagannathan, Skoulakis, and Wang (2010)). The first is
the simplest and most robust, cross-sectional regression which I first used in Chapter 2. Cross-
sectional regression estimation is based on the Fama-MacBeth technique developed in Fama and
MacBeth (1973) to assess the relationship between expected returns and factor betas (Jagannathan,
Skoulakis, and Wang (2010)). It is performed in two passes, which is why it is generally referred
to as “two-pass regression". The first pass is a time series regression to estimate the relationship
between the returns and the factor loadings (betas). The second is a cross sectional regression to
measure the relationship between the factor loadings and average returns.
Consider the following reinterpretation of the beta representation,
E[Rt ] = a01N +Bλ = Xc (3.4)
where
X = [1N B], c = [a0 λ ′]′, (3.5)
X is a N x (K +1) matrix and c is a (K +1) vector of risk premia. Then standard OLS estimation
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of c yields
c = (X ′X)−1X ′E[Rt ]. (3.6)
Two-pass regression is essentially the same estimation technique as Fama-MacBeth estimation,
only in a slightly different form. Unlike Fama-MacBeth, which estimates a separate risk premium
ĉt over the full cross section at each time period in the second pass and then averages over all
estimates, cross-sectional regression estimates a single ĉ over the full time series using an average
of the returns for each cross section. Both forms yield identical results for ĉ and Var(ĉ) mak-
ing them equivalent and interchangeable estimation methods (Kleibergen (2009) and Jagannathan,
Skoulakis, and Wang (2010)).
Regression can be performed either with or without the constant a0. Per theory, this vector
should equal the zero-vector. If regression is run allowing for estimation of the constant, then the
parameter can be tested for significance (Cochrane (2005)). If the model is correctly specified,
then a0 = 0N (Jagannathan, Schaumburg, and Zhou (2010)). Most researchers prefer to estimate
the constant along with the other parameters as a test of model validity.
We can further work backwards from the definition of B and write the time-series regression as
Rt = E[Rt ]+B( ft−E[ ft ])+ut (3.7)
where ut has mean zero and is uncorrelated with the factors. If we substitute for the expected
returns the beta pricing restriction, then we derive the return process
Rt = a01N +B( ft−E[ ft ]+λ )+ut (3.8)
Of course, two-pass estimation is robust and easy to apply in large samples, however it does
impose assumptions that are not overly realistic and, the larger problem, the second pass estima-
tion requires the use of an estimated regressor causing the classic error-in-the-variables problem.
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The standard assumptions for this estimation process include conditional homoskedasticity, which
holds when the returns and factors are identical and independently normally distributed (Jagan-
nathan, Schaumburg, and Zhou (2010)). This is a nice assumption because standard t-tests can
then be calculated to test the validity of the relevant coefficients. But there is some empirical
evidence to indicate that returns are actually heteroskedastic, nonnormally distributed, and even
autocorrelated.
The error-in-the-variables problem is also not one that can be overlooked. There are several
prescribed methods for compensating for this problem. One method is to use portfolios instead of
individual stocks as the testing assets. It is believed that the large number of stocks employed are
estimated precisely enough to compensate for the error. Another method, suggested by Fama and
Macbeth (1973), is to estimate a separate variance matrix accounting for the error in the second
stage, however, this method has proven to overstate the precision of estimates and is subsequently
inefficient under the assumption of conditional homoskedasticity. And yet another method is to
use generalized least squares in the second pass of estimation. c is then formed as
c = (X ′QX)−1X ′QE[Rt ] (3.9)
where Q is positive definite N x N matrix. With this method, portfolio formation may not even
be necessary. This is the method I utilize to account for the error-in-the-variables problem in the
empirical section.
3.4.2 Nonlinear Regression
It is controversial for some researchers to not only estimate risk premia in two passes, but to
use estimated regressors in the second pass. So for this reason, I employ the use of multivariate
nonlinear estimation to calculate betas and lambdas simultaneously. I follow the nonlinear least
squares method as suggested in two papers by Burmeister and McElroy (1988). Nonlinear estima-
tion delivers, even in the absence of normally distributed errors, estimates that are consistent and
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asymptotically normally distributed, all of which can be tested using standard hypothesis testing
methods.
Remember the return process generated in the previous section, ignoring the constant for the
time being:
Rt = B( ft−E[ ft ]+λ )+ut (3.10)
Now consider the regeneration of the process:
ri = [(λ ′⊗ ιT )+F ]bi +ui, (3.11)
where ri are the excess returns for asset i from time t = 1, . . . ,T , λ are the risk premia for the K
factors, ιT is a vector of T ones, F is the matrix of K demeaned factors from time t = 1, . . . ,T , bi
is the vector of betas for asset i, and ui is the error component with mean zero for asset i from time
t = 1, . . . ,T .
Nonlinear least squares estimation works by solving each individual equation i for βi and λ
concurrently. However, the use of nonlinear seemingly unrelated regression allows us to solve all
equations simultaneously (Burmeister and McElroy (1988)). Further simplification implies
ri = χ(λ )bi +ui, (3.12)
where χ(λ ) = (λ ′⊗ ιT )+F . Stacking each equation yields

r1
...
rN
=

χ(λ ) 0
. . .
0 χ(λ )


b1
...
bN
+

u1
...
uN
 (3.13)
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or
R = [IN⊗χ(λ )]B+u (3.14)
where E[u] = 0N,T and E[uu′] = [Σ⊗ IT ]. (3.14) is the NLSUR formula on which nonlinear least
squares is utilized.
3.5 Empirical Results
3.5.1 Cross-Sectional Regression
For the empirical estimation of the cross-sectional regression, I utilize the monthly excess returns
for the 25 portfolios and 49 industry portfolios. I perform regression on four scenarios of risk fac-
tors using different combinations of the regime change dummy and the Fama-French factors, the
excess market return, the size mimicking portfolio Small-Big, and the book-to-market equity mim-
icking portfolio High-Minus-Low (details on the Fama-French factors were discussed in Chapter
2). Not only is it important to understand if the regime change factor is priced but if it is priced in
the presence of other well-known risk factors.
The regime change dummy performs well in the estimation for the risk premia of the 25 port-
folios. The dummy risk premium is approximately the same for each of the four scenarios of risk
factors, at approximately 0.35% on average. This is also in agreement with the amounts of the
other risk premia. In the second scenario, the regime change dummy, while valid, does not require
as much compensation as the market return. In the third scenario, the dummy requires a little
more compensation than the factors that mimic for risks related to firm characteristics, though just
slightly. In the fourth scenario, all of the four factors are employed and all are statistically valid
with the regime change parameter requiring less compensation for risk than the other factors. In-
terestingly, in three of the four scenarios the intercept term is indeed different from zero. This
would imply model misspecification if the errors are not also jointly zero (Cochrane (2005)). The
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second scenario, which considers the regime change dummy and the excess market return as the
sole risk factors in the economy, is the only instance of a zero constant term. The intercept term is
also the largest in the fourth scenario which engages all four risk factors.
Table 3.3: Risk Premia(λi) Results Using Cross-Sectional Regression Estimation
Portfolios Regime Change Market Small-Big High-Low Constant
25 Portfolios 0.324*** 1.045***
(4.31) (14.66)
0.376*** 0.81*** 0.089
(5.75) (3.20) (0.29)
0.389*** 0.203*** 0.333*** 0.587***
(8.36) (3.54) (4.18) (7.16)
0.355*** -1.357*** 0.499*** 0.536*** 1.715***
(9.51) (-3.99) (5.76) (6.66) (5.92)
49 Industry 0.196*** 0.803***
(4.56) (26.65)
0.224*** 0.264** 0.538***
(5.39) (2.49) (4.90)
0.300*** 0.241** -0.067 0.704***
(4.88) (2.22) (-0.68) (11.80)
0.249*** 0.312* 0.062 -0.14 0.516***
(3.76) (1.74) (0.42) (-1.35) (4.21)
Two-pass regression using monthly excess returns: OLS first pass, GLS second pass. z-statistics are reported in parenthesis below regression
estimates. ***significance at the 1% level, **significance at the 5% level, *significance at the 10% level. Portfolios obtained from Kenneth R.
French’s website.
Results are not as clear for the estimation of the risk premia for the 49 industry portfolios. No-
tice that the risk premium of the regime change dummy in all four scenarios is not quite as large as
it was for the 25 portfolios at approximately 0.23% on average. It maintains significance through-
out the scenarios, however, results are not the same for the other factors. The model performs well
in the second scenario with the risk premia for both the regime change and the market factors about
equal. The same applies for the third scenario between the risk premia for the regime change and
size factors, however, the book-equity to market-equity factor maintains insignificant risk premium
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implying that in this scenario it is no longer a risk factor. In the final scenario, the regime factor and
the excess market factor are the only two that have significance. In all four scenarios, the constant
term is statistically different from zero.
The inconsistent results for the 25 and 49 portfolios are interesting. The first estimation would
suggest the political risk in the form of regime change is indeed another risk factor that, along with
the Fama-French factors, can be utilized in asset-pricing theory. But these results are not as clear in
the case of the 49 industry portfolios. The final regression could suggest that political uncertainty is
much more of a concern for industries than firm characteristics and the market, though the market
is still important. This can be profound for industry investment. Coupled with the results obtained
in previous research such as Belo, Gala, and Li (2012) and in Chapter 2, further investigation into
political risk and industry analysis is well-warranted.
3.5.2 Nonlinear Regression
The results for the nonlinear estimates of risk premia are not too different from the cross-sectional
estimates. The risk premium for the regime change dummy variable is still approximately 0.35%
for the 25 portfolios maintaining significance throughout all four scenarios. Similar results are also
derived for the 49 industry portfolios with a risk premium at approximately 0.23% throughout.
The difference between these results and the previous occurs in the estimation of the risk pre-
mia for the Fama-French factors. For the 25 portfolios, the premia for the factors is generally
smaller than what is suggested by cross-sectional regression analysis, which could be due to an
understatement of standard errors using that method. They are also only valid in the final scenario
with all four factors present. But this does corroborate the prior assertion that along with the Fama-
French factors, political risk explains the cross section of returns (we also saw this with the 100
portfolios in the time after 9/11 in Chapter 2). Now, for the 49 industry portfolios, estimates are
again much smaller in each scenario, which encourages the belief that political risk has much more
of an effect on the pricing of industry assets than the Fama-French factors. The constant is also
statistically different from zero in all scenarios for both sets of assets.
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It is also a possibility that the loss of significance in the estimation of risk premia is due to
estimation error or small sample bias. The use of nonlinear least squares could be skewing the
results as nonlinear estimation tends to perform better with larger samples. For these reasons,
an investigation into the effectiveness of nonlinear estimation, particularly generalized method of
moments estimation, on small samples is investigated in Chapter 4.
Table 3.4: Risk Premia(λi) Results Using Nonlinear Regression Estimation
Portfolios Regime Change Market Small-Big High-Low Constant
25 Portfolios 0.324*** 1.494***
(0.075) (0.11)
0.328*** 0.043 1.443***
(0.087) (0.08) (0.154)
0.349*** 0.03 0.151 1.374***
(0.114) (0.122) (0.182) (0.157)
0.366*** -0.684*** 0.369** 0.49** 1.528***
(0.103) (0.242) (0.161) (0.204) (0.175)
49 Industry 0.196*** 1.112***
(0.043) (0.06)
0.192*** 0.022 1.083***
(0.051) (0.039) (0.076)
0.245*** 0.119 -0.127 1.109***
(0.074) (0.11) (0.152) (0.079)
0.243** 0.002 0.113 -0.132 1.114***
(0.116) (0.195) (0.249) (0.183) (0.1)
Nonlinear least squares regression using monthly excess returns. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis below regression estimates. ***signif-
icance at the 1% level, **significance at the 5% level, *significance at the 10% level. Portfolios obtained from Kenneth R. French’s website.
3.6 Conclusion
Due to the difficulty of measuring political risk, I chose to use a variable that measures regime
change, or the change from the Republican Party’s control of the lawmaking portion of the federal
government to Democrat. I examined the control, or voting majority, of two or more houses of
the federal government by either party during the time period between 1927 and 2009. Portioning
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the data as such, I analyze the average excess returns of portfolios organized on size and book-
to-market equity along with various industry portfolios, and all are consistently larger under a
Democratic regime than a Republican regime. A dummy variable was then generated to account
for the change of government control from one political party to the other. This variable is the
regime change variable, which is a proxy for political risk.
Though regime change seems to have an effect on the time series of average excess returns,
further analysis was required to verify if political uncertainty has a similar effect on the cross
section of returns. I performed cross-sectional analysis on the monthly excess returns for the
25 portfolios and 49 industry portfolios using two-pass regression and nonlinear least squares. I
discovered that for the 25 portfolios the regime change variable, in the presence of the Fama-French
factors, is a priced risk factor. But results were not the same for the 49 industry portfolios. In fact,
when combined with the Fama-French factors, the regime change variable was the only valid risk
factor implying that this variable requires more compensation for risk than factors related to firm
characteristics and is thus more important in the pricing of industry assets than the other factors.
Further research will be required to make any conclusive arguments about the validity of the
regime change variable and its approximation of political risk. The inconsistency between the
results for the 25 portfolios and the 49 industry could be due to either variable mismeasurement
or small sample bias. It has been shown that mimicking portfolios created to proxy for nontraded
factors are more efficient and precise in the pricing of assets than variables that are not also returns
(see Balduzzi and Robotti (2008), Balduzzi and Robotti (2009), and Hou and Kimmel (2006)).
So another avenue for future research is to create a set of proper mimicking portfolios that proxy
for the regime change. Or perhaps an alternative variable such as a direct measure of political
news as suggested by Pástor and Veronesi (2011) could be utilized. Eldor and Melnick (2004) use
measures of news in their discovery of the effect of media coverage on terrorism. Though this
might yield statistically interesting results, an economic model would also need to be developed to
further corroborate these results on a theoretical level (see Pástor and Veronesi (2011) and Pástor
and Veronesi (2012)).
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Chapter 4
A Comparison of Regression-Based and
Generalized Method of Moments
Estimation of Linear Factor Model Risk
Premia
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, I have estimated the risk premia of linear factor models using both
regression-based and nonlinear methodologies. In Chapter 2, I assessed the risk premium of the
political factor terrorism risk finding significance with nonindustry returns in the time period from
January 1971 through December 2010 and the time period before September 11, 2001. I used gen-
eralized least squares regression and two-step generalized method of moments estimation in that
analysis. In Chapter 3, I discovered the significantly priced risk premium of the political regime
change dummy variable, another political factor. The results were obtained for data from 1927
through 2009 using generalized least squares estimation and nonlinear least squares regression.
But the question remains, are these results spurious? Assuming that the factors themselves are
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correctly measured, could the significant results all be due to inappropriate estimation methods?
Regression-based estimation has performed well in previous analyses and results are more robust
in larger samples (Jagannathan, Skoulakis, and Wang (2010)). But GMM has demonstrated more
capability in estimation with conditionally heteroskedastic and serially correlated data.
To assess which method is more reliable in smaller samples, I test each using monte carlo
simulations. I compare ordinary least squares regression, generalized least squares regression, two
stage generalized method of moments estimation, and iterated generalized method of moments
estimation using a two-factor model: the political regime change dummy factor and excess market
return factor, both from Chapter 3. I simulate each factor to 960 observations, calibrated based on
the true factors, and using prespecified risk premia, I generate twenty-five returns according to the
linear factor model data-generating process. I discover that the regression-based methods perform
better in smaller samples than the generalized method of moments techniques. Generalized least
squares also slightly outperforms ordinary least squares in terms of rejection rates, however, OLS
produces better point estimates. There is little difference between two-step GMM and iterated with
both methods exhibiting small sample bias.
I further test the abilities of each methodology by setting each risk premium to zero in simula-
tion. I find that all four methods tend to overreject the correctly specified null hypothesis, which is
consistent with previous results for GMM estimation. This indicates the need to exercise caution
in the determination of risk factors. To find true risk factors, it is important to base analysis on
economic theory and not statistical properties alone. Point estimates are reassuring in this sense
because while factors may be found to be statistically significant, they are economically meaning-
less.
4.2 Related Literature
There are many methods to estimate the risk premia of linear factor models, so subsequently, there
are several examinations and assessments of those same methods, though comparisons across
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methodologies is rare. The first set of assessments focus on two-pass procedures. Kleibergen
(2009) tests the risk premia of linear factor models obtained through the Fama-MacBeth tech-
nique. He determines that risk premia can be biased when betas are small or the number of assets
is large. Kan and Zhang (1999) study the risk premia derived by least squares methods by testing
the significance levels of useless factors. They find that these premia are too often significantly
priced. Shanken and Zhou (2007) test beta pricing models by examining the estimators of ordi-
nary, generalized, and weighted least squares methods discovering more precision with the GLS
estimator but also more bias. The authors further provide more robust results by comparing the
previous to generalized method of moments and maximum likelihood techniques finding maxi-
mum likelihood performing well in terms of bias and precision, though not as well as ordinary
least squares.
Generalized method of moments techniques are more rigorously tested than are two-pass pro-
cedures. Kan and Zhou (1999) evaluate GMM estimates of risk premia by comparing the standard
beta model with the stochastic discount factor specification discovering better results with the
beta model (Jagannathan and Wang (2002) later counter this finding no difference between mod-
els under the correct framework). Ferson and Foerster (1994) have examined the finite sample
properties of GMM by focusing on two-stage GMM and iterative. They find superior results with
iterated generalized method of moments. This is extended by Hansen, Heaton, and Yaron (1996)
and Peñaranda and Sentana (2010) who, along with the previous, also examine the continuously-
updating GMM discovering the best estimates with the latter.
Along with the estimation methods themselves, specification tests are also evaluated by Ahn
and Gadarowski (2004) and Kan and Robotti (2008). Under GMM estimation there are two com-
monly used tests for model validity: the Hansen-Jagannathan distance and the J-statistic (also
known as the Hansen test). Ahn and Gadarowski (2004) find that the HJ-distance too often rejects
correctly specified models while the J-statistic only mildly overrejects. Kan and Robotti (2008)
use the stochastic discount factor specification to test the HJ-distance. The authors conclude that
an incorrect framework for the SDF has an effect on the HJ-distance statistic and that modification
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of the statistic is required when using excess returns in estimation.
Unlike the previous analyses, which mostly focus on differing specifications of the same tech-
nical exercise, this endeavor directly compares cross-sectional regression to generalized method of
moments estimation of risk premia under two specifications using simulations of small samples.
Shanken and Zhou (2007) provide the only other simulated comparison of both methods, but they
focus on the two-stage GMM excluding the iterative, which has been shown to be more precise
in previous research (Ferson and Foerster (1994)). For cross-sectional regression, I demonstrate
the Fama-MacBeth technique under both ordinary least squares and generalized least squares es-
timations. For generalized method of moments procedures, I use two-step and iterative GMM. I
test the abilities of these estimators by generating twenty-five returns under a two-factor model
using simulations of the political risk factor and market return factor from Chapter 3. I find that
the regression-based methodologies outperform the generalized method of moments estimators in
terms of point estimates and power. But I also discover that all four procedures tend to overreject
a true null hypothesis.
4.3 The Linear Beta Pricing Model
Before we begin, it is important to understand linear factor models and the beta pricing restric-
tion. Most asset pricing models are simply variations of the general pricing formula wherein
price today is equated to expected future discounted payoff: pt = E[mt+1xt+1] or equivalently
1 = E[mt+1,Rt+1] where Rt+1 =
xt+1
pt
are gross returns on assets (Cochrane (2005)). Asset pricing
models usually only differ in their interpretation of the stochastic discount factor mt+1. An impor-
tant class of asset pricing models is the linear factor model which interprets the stochastic discount
factor as a linear combination of various pervasive risk factors in the form of m = b0− f ′b1 (in this
example, I use a single factor and I eliminate the time subscripts for simplicity). It has been pre-
viously shown that the beta pricing restriction is equivalent to the linear stochastic discount factor
assumption (see Cochrane (2005)).
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Estimation is further simplified with the use of excess returns in place of gross returns, although
the use of excess returns requires slightly different initial assumptions. Under excess returns, the
mean of the stochastic discount factor cannot be identified (Kan and Robotti (2008)). So some
normalization of the discount factor is warranted: E[mt+1rt+1] = 0 where m = 1−b[ f −E( f )] and
r are returns in excess of the risk-free rate. Notice that this requires that returns and factors be
demeaned in estimation (Jagannathan and Wang (2002) and Kan and Robotti (2008)).
Denote by Rt a vector of returns in excess of the risk free rate on N assets at time t and ft as
the vector of K economy-wide factors at time t. Now assume that returns follow the linear process
Ri,t = αi + f ′t βi +ui,t , i = 1, . . . ,N, t = 1, . . . ,T (4.1)
where the errors ui,t are uncorrelated with the factors for all i with mean zero and βi is the vector
of betas, or factor loadings, for asset i which is given by
βi = E[( ft−E[ ft ])( ft−E[ ft ])′]−1E[(Ri,t−E[Ri,t ])( ft−E[ ft ])], (4.2a)
ΣR = E[(Ri,t−E[Ri,t ])(Ri,t−E[Ri,t ])′], (4.2b)
Σ f = E[( ft−E[ ft ])( ft−E[ ft ])′]. (4.2c)
Under these assumptions, the linear beta pricing model places the restriction
E[Ri,t ] = a0 +λ ′βi, i = 1, . . . ,N (4.3)
where λ is the vector of risk premia and a0 is a vector of constants (Jagannathan, Schaumburg,
and Zhou (2010)). Another way to interpret (4.1) is to consider the factor loadings, βi, as the
relationship between the risk factors, ft , and the returns, Rt . Then λ can be interpreted as the price
of risk or the amount of compensation that investors require for holding onto assets with the risk
factors present. If λ is positive and significant, then we would say that the factor is priced because
it does explain the variation in the cross section of asset prices.
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Classic articles by Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986) and Fama and French (1993) use linear factor
models to explain the cross sections of assets, each with their own risk factors. While Chen,
Roll, and Ross (1986) use macroeconomic variables in their analysis, Fama and French (1993)
create mimicking portfolios that capture the pervasive risks presented by firm characteristics such
as firm size and book-to-market effects. Along with these two factors, the authors also use the
market portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate to create the Fama-French factors, which are now
commonly used in empirical studies as they do indeed account for much of the variation in the
cross section of security returns.
4.4 Estimation Methods
There are many methods for estimating the risk premia of multifactor asset pricing models. For
the purposes of this analysis, I focus on two cross-sectional regression techniques and two gener-
alized method of moments procedures. The first is the simplest and most robust, cross-sectional
regression which I have previously used in Chapters 2 and 3 for the estimation of various measures
of political risk.
4.4.1 Cross-Sectional Regression
4.4.1.1 The Fama-MacBeth Technique
Cross-sectional regression estimation is based on the Fama-MacBeth technique developed in Fama
and MacBeth (1973) to assess the relationship between expected returns and factor betas (Jagan-
nathan, Skoulakis, and Wang (2010)). The first pass is a time series regression to estimate the
relationship between the returns and the factor loadings (betas). The second pass estimates a sep-
arate risk premium at each time period using the full cross section of betas. The Fama-MacBeth
risk premium estimate is then a time-series average of those individual risk premia.
Consider the following reinterpretation of the beta representation (I follow the notation of Ja-
59
gannathan, Skoulakis, and Wang (2010)):
E[Rt ] = a01N +Bλ = Xc (4.4)
where
X = [1N B], c = [a0 λ ′]′, (4.5)
X is a N x (K +1) matrix and c is a (K +1) vector of risk premia. ĉ is then estimated at each time
interval
ĉt = (X̂ ′T X̂T )
−1X̂ ′T Rt , t = 1, . . . ,T, (4.6)
where X̂T = [1N B̂T ]. The estimate ĉ is the average of the full set of T estimates
¯̂c =
1
T
Σ
T
t+1ĉt . (4.7)
4.4.1.2 Ordinary Least Squares
Two-pass regression is essentially the same estimation technique as Fama-MacBeth estimation,
only in a slightly different form. Similar to Fama-MacBeth, the first pass is a time series regres-
sion to estimate the relationship between the returns and the factor loadings (betas). The second,
however, is a cross-sectional regression to measure the relationship between the factor loadings
and average returns. Unlike Fama-MacBeth, cross-sectional regression estimates a single ĉ over
the full time series using an average of the returns for each cross section. Standard OLS estimation
of c yields
c = (X ′X)−1X ′E[Rt ]. (4.8)
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Since it is performed in two passes, cross-sectional regression using OLS is generally referred
to as “two-pass regression". Both forms yield identical results for ĉ and Var(ĉ) making them equiv-
alent and interchangeable estimation methods (Kleibergen (2009) and Jagannathan, Skoulakis, and
Wang (2010)). (Note that Kleibergen (2009) uses demeaned excess returns and factors to first es-
timate β̂ , then the estimated betas and the average values of returns to estimate λ̂ . This method is
similarly prescribed by Jagannathan, Skoulakis, and Wang (2010).)
Regression can be performed either with or without the constant a0. Per theory, this vector
should equal the zero-vector. If regression is run allowing for estimation of the constant, then
the parameter can be tested for significance, or it can be suppressed altogether assuming a true
null hypothesis (Cochrane (2005)). Most researchers prefer to estimate the constant along with
the other parameters as a test of model validity. If the model is correctly specified, then a0 = 0N
(Jagannathan, Schaumburg, and Zhou (2010)). I include the constant parameter in simulations but
I do not report those results.
Of course, two-pass estimation is robust and easy to apply in large samples, however it does
impose assumptions that are not overly realistic and, the larger problem, the second pass estima-
tion requires the use of an estimated regressor causing the classic error-in-the-variables problem.
The standard assumptions for this estimation process include conditional homoskedasticity, which
holds when the returns and factors are identical and independently normally distributed (Jagan-
nathan, Schaumburg, and Zhou (2010)). This is a nice assumption because standard t-tests can
then be calculated to test the validity of the relevant coefficients. But there is some empirical
evidence to indicate that returns are actually heteroskedastic, nonnormally distributed, and even
autocorrelated. GMM performs well under these conditions.
4.4.1.3 Generalized Least Squares
The error-in-the-variables problem is not one that can be overlooked. There are several prescribed
methods for compensating for this problem. One method is to use portfolios instead of individual
stocks as the testing assets. It is believed that the large number of stocks employed are estimated
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precisely enough to compensate for the error. Another method, suggested by Fama and Macbeth
(1973), is to estimate a separate variance matrix accounting for the error in the second stage, how-
ever, this method has proven to overstate the precision of estimates and is subsequently inefficient
under the assumption of conditional homoskedasticity. And yet another method is to use general-
ized least squares in the second pass of estimation. c is then formed as
c = (X ′QX)−1X ′QE[Rt ] (4.9)
where Q is positive definite N x N matrix. With this method, portfolio formation may not even be
necessary.
Another less-frequently implemented technique includes weighted least squares in the second
pass of estimation. But I focus my analysis on the most common methods. For comparison, I
estimate risk premia using both OLS cross-sectional regression and GLS. I analyze both techniques
relative to the GMM procedures two-stage and iterative, detailed in the next section. And because
of the assumed return, factor, and error properties necessary for least squares estimation, estimates
should be robust to standard t-testing and pricing error evaluation. T-statistics are the more popular
assessments of model validity using cross-sectional regression estimation, but I do not assess that
in this endeavor.
4.4.2 Generalized Method of Moments Estimation
4.4.2.1 GMM Approach
I also examine the cross section of returns using generalized method of moments estimation. This
technique is appealing to use under more realistic assumptions because it allows for serial correla-
tion and conditional heteroskedasticity (see Jagannathan, Skoulakis, and Wang (2010)). However,
GMM is the most efficient unbiased estimator when returns and factors are homoskedastic and
independent. The generalized method of moments is further advantageous because it allows es-
timations of all model parameters in a single pass eliminating the earlier error-in-the-variables
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problem. But it should be noted that GMM has been known to overreject models with small sam-
ple size and time series compared to other methods of estimation. GMM can be performed using
either the linear beta pricing model representation or the stochastic discount factor representation.
Both are asymptotically equivalent, so for comparison, I will estimate the empirical model using
the linear beta representation.
Consider the vector Rt of excess returns on N assets and ft the vector of K risk factors, both at
time t. The reiteration of the beta restriction is
E[Rt ] = Bλ (4.10)
dropping the intercept for convenience. If returns follow the process Rt = φ +B ft +ut , then we can
substitute the beta restriction through φ = E[Rt ]−BE[ ft ] = Bλ −BE[ ft ] into the returns process:
Rt = B( ft−E[ ft ]+λ )+ut , (4.11)
where B is the vector of factor loadings, B = E[Rt ,( ft −E[ ft ])]Var[ ft ]−1, and the properties of ut
are
E[ut ] = 0N (4.12a)
E[ut f ′t ] = 0NxK (4.12b)
From the above equations the moment restrictions are then
E[Rt−B( ft−E[ ft ]+λ )] = 0N (4.13a)
E[[Rt−B( ft−E[ ft ]+λ )] f ′t ] = 0NxK (4.13b)
E[ ft−E[ ft ]] = 0K (4.13c)
The last equation identifies the risk premium λ . These three equations combine to formulate
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the expected value of the moment restriction, or more precisely E[g(xt ,θ0)] = 0N where θ =
[δ ′ vec(B)′ µ ′]′. We then use the sample analogue gT (θ) = 1T Σ
T
t=1g(xt ,θ) to solve
min
θ
gT (θ)′S−1T gT (θ), (4.14)
where ST is the consistent estimator of the spectral density matrix of g(xt ,θ), and find the GMM
estimator θ̂ .
4.4.2.2 Two-Step Estimator
In most applications GMM is performed either in two stages or iteratively, the difference being the
number of times the weighting matrix is reestimated. The two-step estimator works by first using
an identity matrix to weight the moment conditions so that θ̂ is chosen to minimize
min
θ
gT (θ)′gT (θ) (4.15)
(Hansen, Heaton, and Yaron (1996)). Using those initial parameter estimates, another estimate of
S−1T is obtained and once again θ̂ is chosen to minimize
min
θ
gT (θ)′Ŝ−1T gT (θ), (4.16)
wherein the new estimate of θ̂ contains the estimates of the second stage parameters (Ferson and
Foerster (1994)).
4.4.2.3 Iterative Estimator
The iterative estimator continues from the two-step estimator and reestimates S−1T until θ̂ converges
(Hansen, Heaton, and Yaron (1996)). Both methods can be utilized under either the beta model
specification or the stochastic discount factor specification with similar results obtained with cor-
rect framework for the latter (Jagannathan and Wang (2002)). A third GMM procedure includes the
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continuously-updating estimator wherein the covariance matrix is repeatedly altered as θ̂ changes.
But I choose to compare the more often used two stage estimator and iterative estimator with the
cross-sectional methods, OLS and GLS, in estimation of risk premia. Specification tests for the
GMM include the J-statistic (the Hansen test) and the Hansen-Jagannathan distance statistic with
more overrejections of correctly specified models from the HJ-distance test (Ahn and Gadarowski
(2004)). This analysis, however, does not assess these statistics.
4.5 Simulations
To compare the small sample properties of least squares regression with generalized method of mo-
ments estimation, I estimate and test the abilities of each with a two-factor model. The simulation
process is similar to that of Kan and Zhou (1999). I obtain betas and variances from regression
using the 25 monthly portfolios from Kenneth R. French’s data library, the political risk factor
and excess market return both from Chapter 3, which dates from January 1927 through December
2009 (French (2012)). With these parameters, and prespecified risk premia, I simulate returns to
960 observations in 1,000 draws of each dataset.
Twenty-five excess returns are generated according to the process in equation (4.11) under
the beta-pricing restriction in (4.10) with simulations of two factors: the political regime change
dummy variable as factor 1 and the Fama-French excess market return as factor 2. The political
factor is drawn from the Bernoulli distribution with the probability calibrated to the ratio of demo-
crat to republican regimes from the Chapter 3 sample. To simulate the market factor, I create a
zero-mean AR(1) process calibrated to the auto-correlation and volatility of the demeaned market
return. The error terms are drawn from a multivariate normal distribution with mean zero and
variance matrix set to the covariances of the model residuals obtained from regression in Chapter
3, with zeros for the off-diagonal elements.
For the simulations in Table 4.1, lambda values are set to the actual lambda values obtained
from regression using the 25 portfolios at λ1 = 0.376% and λ2 = 0.81% for the political factor
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risk premium and the market factor risk premium, respectively. The table reports the results for
ordinary least squares (OLS), generalized least squares (GLS), two-step generalized method of
moments (GMM2), and iterated generalized method of moments estimation methods. Reported
information includes average lambda values, standard errors, and t-statistics for both λ1 and λ2.
More importantly, Table 4.1 also reports the rejection rates of the hypothesis of zero risk premium,
or an insignificant risk factor. Using t-ratio tests at the 95% confidence interval, I discover the
rejection rates of the null hypothesis H0 : λk = 0 in 1,000 draws for k = 1,2.
Table 4.1: Power Tests– Rejection Rates of the Null Hypothesis H0 : λk = 0
OLS GLS GMM2 GMMI
Testing H0 : λ1 = 0 when λ1 = 0.376%
Average Lambda 0.285 0.274 0.253 0.217
Average Standard Error 0.067 0.065 0.081 0.082
Average T-Statistic 4.416 4.467 4.085 3.985
Rejection Rate 0.907 0.927 0.803 0.773
Testing H0 : λ2 = 0 when λ2 = 0.81%
Average Lambda 0.666 0.686 0.638 0.636
Average Standard Error 0.284 0.276 0.267 0.261
Average T-Statistic 2.420 2.522 2.559 2.547
Rejection Rate 0.597 0.667 0.633 0.643
Using t-ratio tests, this table reports the probability of rejecting H0 : λk = 0 at the 95% confidence interval in 1,000 simulations. Setting the true
values of λ1 = 0.376% and λ2 = 0.81%, twenty-five returns are generated to 960 observations according to the process:
Ri,t = αi + f ′1,t βi,1 + f
′
2,t βi,2 +ui,t , t = 1, . . . ,960, i = 1, . . . ,25,
where errors are multivariate normally distributed and betas and variances are obtained from estimation using actual returns. Factor 1 is the political
factor, simulated using the Bernoulli distribution. The second factor is the excess market return, simulated as an AR(1) process. The beta-pricing
model places the restriction:
E[Ri,t ] = λ ′1βi,1 +λ
′
2βi,2
The table also includes average risk premia, standard errors, and t-statistics.
Results indicate slightly more power from the least squares methods over the GMM methods.
In the top panel, a false null is correctly rejected more than 90% of the time for the first risk factor
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under both least squares methodologies, with generalized leasts squares showing just slightly more
power than ordinary least squares. The GMM procedures perform well, but with slightly less
power around 80% and larger standard errors. The least squares methods also provide better point
estimates, with iterated GMM the furthest in estimation, on average, from the actual value of λ1.
OLS and GLS do not perform too differently from one another nor do the GMM methods from
each other.
In the lower panel, which demonstrates the results of estimation of the market factor risk pre-
mium, better point estimates are also obtained under least squares regressions. GLS just outper-
forms OLS in terms of estimates and power. For the market factor, unlike the political factor,
the GMM estimators perform better than ordinary regression, however, GLS maintains the larger
power of all four methodologies. Though the average lambda values are closer to the actual lambda
value under least squares estimation for the second risk factor, standard errors are smaller under
GMM. In terms of power and point estimates, generalized least squares outperforms the other
estimation procedures for factor 2.
Overall, it appears that generalized least squares maintains more power in rejecting a false null
hypothesis, however the full table produces inconsistent results for the other estimators. For the
political factor, which is nontraded, OLS produces the best point estimate and maintains power
just beneath GLS. But for the market factor, a traded factor, OLS maintains the lowest power
but better point estimates than either GMM method. The power results of ordinary least squares
could be due to the lack of a correction for the error-in-the-variables problem in the second stage
of estimation, although previous research indicates that the understatement in standard errors is
minimal (Shanken and Zhou (2007)). There is evidence to suggest that GMM does maintain more
small sample bias.
Table 4.2 presents the results for size comparisons. The top panel presents the results of esti-
mation when λ1 is set to zero and the lower panel when λ2 is set to zero. Using t-ratio tests at the
95% confidence interval, I discover the rejection rates of the null hypothesis H0 : λk = 0 , which
is correctly specified. In general, lower rejection rates of a correctly specified null hypothesis are
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preferred. In Table 4.2, rejection rates are consistently well above 5% for both panels.
In the top panel, point estimates amongst the various estimation methods are not too different
from one another. Negative risk premia would imply that investors pay to hold onto an asset with
this risk factor present. This is counterintuitive to standard asset pricing theory. But the small
estimates of lambda when the true value is zero indicate that while some of the factors may be
statistically significant, they are not economically important. Interestingly, standard errors are
larger from least squares regressions, although rejection rates are lower. Results indicate that, for
factor 1, generalized method of moments procedures tend to overreject a correctly specified null
hypothesis more so than regression-based methods.
Table 4.2: Size Tests– Rejection Rates of the Null Hypothesis H0 : λk = 0
OLS GLS GMM2 GMMI
Testing H0 : λ1 = 0 when λ1 = 0
Average Lambda -0.004 0.006 -0.003 -0.009
Average Standard Error 0.057 0.053 0.046 0.048
Average T-Statistic -0.074 0.087 -0.052 -0.209
Rejection Rate 0.250 0.273 0.357 0.377
Testing H0 : λ2 = 0 when λ2 = 0
Average Lambda -0.110 -0.095 -0.116 -0.158
Average Standard Error 0.282 0.274 0.268 0.270
Average T-Statistic -0.439 -0.400 -0.587 -0.658
Rejection Rate 0.157 0.217 0.213 0.187
Using t-ratio tests, this table reports the probability of rejecting H0 : λk = 0 at the 95% confidence interval in 1,000 simulations. Two separate
models are evaluated within this table: the top panel sets λ1 = 0, the bottom panel sets λ2 = 0. Twenty-five returns are generated to 960 observations
according to the process:
Ri,t = αi + f ′1,t βi,1 + f
′
2,t βi,2 +ui,t , t = 1, . . . ,960, i = 1, . . . ,25,
where errors are multivariate normally distributed and betas and variances are obtained from estimation using actual returns. Factor 1 is the political
factor, simulated using the Bernoulli distribution. The second factor is the excess market return, simulated as an AR(1) process. The beta-pricing
model places the restriction:
E[Ri,t ] = λ ′1βi,1 +λ
′
2βi,2
The table also includes average risk premia, standard errors, and t-statistics.
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The lower panel, once again, produces incongruent results. OLS generates lower rejection
rates, but interestingly, iterated GMM does not perform that far behind. While risk premia are
still, in general, negative, these values are larger and more problematic in terms of estimation of
false factors. This indicates that one must use caution in the determination of risk factors. All four
estimation methods can wrongly reject a correct null hypothesis and produce risk premia estimates
of consequence. This highlights the importance of discovering risk factors not only based on
statistical methodologies but economic theory.
4.6 Conclusion
Using ordinary least squares, generalized least squares, two stage generalized method of moments,
and iterated generalized method of moments estimation procedures, I estimate and test the small
sample properties of each with a two factor model. I generate twenty-five excess returns using
factors simulated to mimic the political regime change dummy factor and excess market return
factor from Chapter 3. In terms of power and point estimates, I find that the least squares regressors,
ordinary and generalized, outperform the generalized method of moments estimators, two-step
and iterated. While, in general, the least squares methods are preferred to GMM, GLS tends to
perform better than OLS for power, however, ordinary least squares delivers better point estimates.
Both generalized method of moments procedures exhibit lower power and more bias in estimates,
supporting the argument that GMM displays small sample bias.
While all methodologies demonstrate capabilities in rejecting a false null hypothesis, all meth-
ods, in turn, also incorrectly reject a true null, with perhaps ordinary least squares demonstrating
the least tendency to overreject (as previously suggested, the generalized methods continue to over-
reject a correctly specified model). This indicates the need to exercise caution in the determination
of risk factors. To find true risk factors, it is important to base analysis on economic theory and not
statistical properties alone. Point estimates are reassuring in this sense because while factors may
be found to be statistically significant, they are economically meaningless.
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The results obtained could be attributed to several influences. First, it is possible that the
results from ordinary least squares regression understate the true standard errors, as this estimation
procedure does not account for the error-in-the-variables problem. Although it has been shown
that the understatement would only be slight (Shanken and Zhou (2007)). It also possible that
because the simulated error terms are generated as i.i.d. this would make OLS the more efficient
estimator. Perhaps if the error terms were simulated to allow for heteroskedasticity results would
differ. Finally, the length of the time series (equivalent to 960 months or 80 years, in this case) and
the number of portfolios may affect the performance of all estimation methods. An experiment
with fewer portfolios and smaller time series could either exacerbate results or refine them. All of
these possible influencers should be investigated in future research endeavors.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
It is generally accepted that political events, decisions, and actions have an effect on the economy
and, particularly, financial markets. I hypothesize that political risk, the result of uncertainty over
the costs of political outcomes, contributes significantly and positively to asset prices. Using two
different measures of political risk, I find support for the argument that political risk cannot be
ignored in the pricing of securities. I further analyze the most commonly used techniques to esti-
mate risk premia in linear factor models. I find that, in simulations, regression-based techniques
perform better in smaller samples than generalized method of moments procedures. But in actual
data, there is little performance difference amongst the four estimators, ordinary least squares, gen-
eralized least squares, two stage generalized method of moments, and iterated generalized method
of moments.
It has been argued that terrorism is suggestive of alterations in the deeper economic funda-
mentals, and it is in this context that I analyze terrorism risk, as representative of political risk.
According to both cross-sectional regression analysis and generalized method of moments esti-
mation techniques, terrorism risk is systematic and priced in the American financial market from
January 1971 to December 2010 for nonindustry returns. However results contrast when the data is
separated into time periods before and after September 11, 2001, with the latter period indicating
no terrorism risk present. In terms of the contributors to terror, I have determined that social pa-
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rameters like education and democracy variables contribute more to terror than economic variables
like income and employment rates. I further determined that the geographic location of a country
positively contributes to terror. If terrorism is in fact suggestive of underlying political unrest, then
examination of the determinants of terrorism is important because it is another means by which
to mitigate future terror attack risk. Another avenue for future research could be discovery of the
complete list of terrorism determinants and the incorporation of the contributing socioeconomic
variables in asset pricing models.
I also evaluated a variable that measures regime change, or the change from the Republican
Party’s control of the lawmaking portion of the federal government to Democrat, as a proxy for
political risk. I analyze the average excess returns when the federal government is under the control
of each respective party in the time period from 1927 through 2009. I find that averages are larger
under a Democratic regime. I then generated a dummy variable to account for the change of regime,
or government control, and I discovered that for the 25 portfolios the regime change variable, in the
presence of the Fama-French factors, is a priced risk factor. But results were not the same for the
49 industry portfolios. In fact, when combined with the Fama-French factors, the regime change
variable was the only valid risk factor implying that this variable requires more compensation for
risk than factors related to firm characteristics and is thus more important in the pricing of industry
assets than the other factors.
All risk premia were estimated using regression-based and nonlinear estimation techniques. I
analyze which method, OLS, GLS, two-step GMM, and iterative GMM, performs better in small
samples. Using monte carlo simulations, I generate twenty-five returns from a two-factor model:
the political regime change dummy factor and excess market return factor, both from Chapter 3. I
discover that the regression-based methods perform better in smaller samples than the generalized
method of moments techniques. Generalized least squares also slightly outperforms ordinary least
squares in terms of rejection rates, however, OLS produces better point estimates. There is little
difference between two-step GMM and iterated with both methods exhibiting small sample bias. I
further test the abilities of each methodology by setting each risk premium to zero in simulation. I
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find that all four methods tend to overreject the correctly specified null hypothesis. This indicates
the need to exercise caution in the determination of risk factors. To find true risk factors, it is
important to base analysis on not only statistical properties but also economic theory.
The discovery of economically significant risk factors is the endeavor of this dissertation. Al-
though both measures of political risk perform well in asset pricing models, there are avenues for
future research that would refine the measurement of political uncertainty. A proper mimicking
portfolio might also be an avenue for further inspection. It has been shown that mimicking port-
folios created to proxy for nontraded factors are more efficient and precise in the pricing of assets
than variables that are not also returns (see Balduzzi and Robotti (2008), Balduzzi and Robotti
(2009), and Hou and Kimmel (2006)). One set of possibilities focuses on the terrorism-aspect of
political risk. Using the S&P 500, Karloyi (2007) develops his own set of “terrorism portfolios"
and derives two terrorism-related investment strategies: the first is a portfolio of S&P 500 stocks
assembled based on terrorism risk scores and the second are terrorism-related risk exposure port-
folios. Both of these could be used as a stand-in for terrorism risk and the application is an avenue
for future research.
Another alternative variable such as a direct measure of political news as suggested by Pástor
and Veronesi (2011) could be utilized. Eldor and Melnick (2004) use measures of news in their
discovery of the effect of media coverage on terrorism. Though these alternatives might yield
statistically interesting results, an economic model would also need to be developed to further
corroborate these results on a theoretical level (see Pástor and Veronesi (2011) and Pástor and
Veronesi (2012)). Robust assessment methods, such as the use of time-varying betas or conditional
linear factor models, could also yield interesting results.
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Appendix A
Summary Statistics for the Terror Events Panel by Region
Region Total Yearly Avg Std Dev Min Max
North America 836 14.667 21.113 0 95
CentralAmerica & Caribbean 1877 7.599 36.022 0 500
South America 6568 28.807 93.146 0 659
East Asia 373 9.816 18.531 0 93
Southeast Asia 3628 21.216 49.999 0 320
South Asia 10152 76.331 114.095 0 666
Central Asia 214 2.816 7.355 0 40
Western Europe 3043 8.898 20.280 0 156
Eastern Europe 529 2.320 6.496 0 57
MiddleEast & North Africa 10205 29.839 110.428 0 1104
Sub-Saharan Africa 3829 5.167 19.614 0 272
Russia & Former Soviet 1383 9.099 24.435 0 173
Australasia & Oceania 118 2.070 3.494 0 18
Total 42755 15.204 59.479 0 1104
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Summary Statistics for the Terror Events Panel by Country
Country Total Yearly Avg Std Dev Min Max
North America
Canada 34 1.789 2.175 0 8
Mexico 298 15.684 26.854 0 95
United States 504 26.526 18.341 0 55
Central America & Caribbean
Antigua and Barbuda 2 0.105 0.315 0 1
Belize 5 0.263 0.806 0 3
Costa Rica 9 0.474 0.772 0 2
Cuba 30 1.579 3.717 0 14
Dominican Republic 43 2.263 4.039 0 12
El Salvador 753 39.632 119.21 0 500
Guatemala 431 22.684 33.495 0 84
Haiti 172 9.053 11.559 0 34
Honduras 107 5.632 8.18 0 22
Jamaica 21 1.105 2.208 0 8
Nicaragua 196 10.316 19.599 0 80
Panama 90 4.737 10.06 0 41
Puerto Rico 18 0.947 1.87 0 6
South America
Argentina 165 8.684 12.706 0 41
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Country Total Yearly Avg Std Dev Min Max
Bolivia 98 5.158 10.383 0 38
Brazil 165 8.684 12.033 0 40
Chile 476 25.053 50.002 0 161
Colombia 3541 186.368 180.198 0 598
Ecuador 89 4.684 5.935 0 23
Guyana 18 0.947 1.545 0 5
Paraguay 27 1.421 3.043 0 12
Peru 1798 94.632 193.115 0 659
Suriname 16 0.842 1.922 0 7
Uruguay 24 1.263 2.621 0 11
Venezuela 151 7.947 11.38 0 41
East Asia
China 154 8.105 14.456 0 62
Japan 219 11.526 22.152 0 93
Southeast Asia
Brunei 1 0.53 0.229 0 1
Cambodia 240 12.632 20.63 0 67
Indonesia 454 23.895 27.09 0 87
Laos 15 0.789 1.619 0 6
Malaysia 13 0.684 1.057 0 3
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Summary Statistics for the Terror Events Panel by Country
Country Total Yearly Avg Std Dev Min Max
Myanmar 163 8.579 9.02 0 35
Philippines 1691 89 82.537 0 320
Thailand 1041 54.789 86.305 0 292
South Asia
Vietnam 10 0.526 1.02 0 4
Afghanistan 1516 79.789 124.995 0 398
Bangladesh 597 31.421 39.382 0 161
Bhutan 4 0.211 0.713 0 3
India 3543 186.474 115.894 0 520
Nepal 461 24.263 30.446 0 100
Pakistan 2849 149.947 177.586 0 666
Sri Lanka 1182 62.211 50.358 0 175
Central Asia
Kazakhstan 9 0.474 1.02 0 4
Kyrgyzstan 21 1.105 1.56 0 5
Tajikistan 165 8.684 12.992 0 40
Uzbekistan 19 1 2.108 0 8
Western Europe
Austria 44 2.316 3.417 0 12
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Country Total Yearly Avg Std Dev Min Max
Belgium 43 2.263 2.806 0 9
Denmark 14 0.739 1.628 0 6
Finland 5 0.263 0.452 0 1
France 310 16.316 15.829 0 50
Germany 554 29.158 49.141 0 156
Greece 465 24.474 17.902 0 59
Iceland 1 0.053 0.229 0 1
Ireland 60 3.158 4.113 0 16
Italy 171 9 9.713 0 37
Luxembourg 4 0.211 0.713 0 3
Netherlands 55 2.895 3.446 0 12
Norway 11 0.579 0.838 0 2
Portugal 6 0.316 0.82 0 3
Spain 938 49.368 31.434 0 113
Sweden 40 2.105 3.071 0 12
Switzerland 31 1.632 1.77 0 6
United Kingdom 291 15.316 20.144 0 76
Eastern Europe
Albania 70 3.684 9.499 0 42
Bosnia-Herzegovina 145 7.632 11.917 0 42
Bulgaria 36 1.895 2.826 0 12
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Summary Statistics for the Terror Events Panel by Country
Country Total Yearly Avg Std Dev Min Max
Croatia 48 2.526 5.591 0 24
Czech Republic 16 0.842 1.344 0 4
Hungary 40 2.105 4.689 0 17
Macedonia 96 5.053 12.895 0 57
Moldova 18 0.9474 2.505 0 11
Poland 32 1.684 2.382 0 7
Romania 5 0.263 0.562 0 2
Slovak Republic 17 0.895 1.524 0 5
Slovenia 6 0.316 0.749 0 3
MiddleEast & North Africa
Algeria 1673 88.053 93.545 0 339
Cyprus 53 2.789 4.036 0 11
Egypt 435 22.895 41.188 0 143
Iran 162 8.526 9.605 0 43
Iraq 4132 217.474 379.466 0 1104
Israel 857 45.105 35.851 0 131
Jordan 42 2.211 2.679 0 11
Kuwait 31 1.632 3.515 0 15
Lebanon 652 34.316 31.28 0 91
Libya 8 0.421 0.961 0 4
Morocco 20 1.053 1.81 0 6
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Country Total Yearly Avg Std Dev Min Max
Qatar 4 0.211 0.419 0 1
Saudi Arabia 48 2.526 4.274 0 18
Syria 9 0.474 0.841 0 3
Tunisia 12 0.632 0.895 0 3
Turkey 1889 99.421 135.433 0 515
United Arab Emirates 3 0.158 0.501 0 2
Yemen 175 9.211 7.48 0 25
Sub-Saharan Africa
Angola 414 21.789 46.854 0 206
Benin 9 0.474 0.905 0 3
Botswana 2 0.105 0.315 0 1
Burkina Faso 2 0.105 0.459 0 2
Burundi 348 18.316 24.125 0 83
Cameroon 21 1.105 1.997 0 6
Central African Republic 12 0.632 1.012 0 4
Chad 40 2.105 2.923 0 11
Djibouti 14 0.737 1.447 0 6
Eritrea 7 0.368 0.761 0 2
Ethiopia 83 4.368 3.847 0 13
Gabon 3 0.158 0.375 0 1
Gambia 3 0.158 0.375 0 1
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Country Total Yearly Avg Std Dev Min Max
Ghana 16 0.842 2.007 0 8
Guinea 10 0.526 1.073 0 4
Guinea-Bissau 7 0.368 0.955 0 4
Kenya 100 5.263 7.519 0 30
Lesotho 4 0.211 0.713 0 3
Liberia 27 1.421 2.388 0 10
Madagascar 20 1.053 1.957 0 7
Malawi 4 0.211 0.713 0 3
Mali 45 2.368 4.003 0 13
Mauritania 5 0.263 0.562 0 2
Mozambique 86 4.526 9.851 0 35
Namibia 30 1.579 4.623 0 20
Niger 50 2.632 4.179 0 16
Nigeria 288 15.158 21.096 0 76
Rwanda 132 6.947 11.043 0 33
Senegal 85 4.474 6.670 0 26
Sierra Leone 88 4.632 6.491 0 22
Somalia 512 26.947 49.793 0 167
South Africa 866 45.579 77.695 0 272
Sudan 142 7.474 8.940 0 32
Swaziland 11 0.579 0.769 0 3
Tanzania 7 0.368 0.496 0 1
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Country Total Yearly Avg Std Dev Min Max
Togo 45 2.368 6.660 0 27
Uganda 241 12.684 9.256 0 30
Zambia 25 1.316 2.518 0 8
Zimbabwe 25 1.316 1.887 0 6
Russia & Former Soviet
Azerbaijan 38 2.000 3.399 0 12
Belarus 7 0.368 0.597 0 2
Estonia 13 0.684 1.455 0 6
Georgia 163 8.579 10.854 0 39
Latvia 16 0.842 1.119 0 4
Lithuania 8 0.421 0.838 0 3
Russia 1107 58.263 43.57 0 173
Ukraine 31 1.632 2.499 0 10
Australasia & Oceania
Australia 46 2.421 2.694 0 9
New Zealand 15 0.789 1.316 0 5
Papua New Guinea 57 3.000 5.121 0 18
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Appendix B
Years of Government Control Based on Regime
Regime Control Democrat Years Republican Years
1. Controls Executive Branch* 1933-1952;
1961-1968;
1977-1980;
1993-2000;
2009
41 1927-1932;
1953-1960;
1969-1976;
1981-1992;
2001-2008
43
2. Controls Legislative Branch** 1933-1946;
1949-1952;
1955-1980;
1987-1994;
2007-2009
55 1927-1932;
1947-1948;
1953-1954;
1995-2006
23
3. Controls both branches*** 1933-1946;
1949-1952;
1961-1968;
1977-1980;
1993-1994;
2009
33 1927-1932;
1953-1954;
1981-1986;
2001-2008
23
*Controls the White House only. **Controls both houses of Congress, the Senate and the House of Representatives. ***Controls the White House
and at least one house of Congress. Control indicates the party with the majority elected seats in the house irrespective of what party is in control of
the remaining houses.
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Average Excess Returns– Executive Branch Control
Democrat
Annual Average Return Variance Std Error t-Statistic Population Avg
25 Portfolios 18.324 887.852 0.931 7.537 11.31
49 Industry 15.211 907.083 0.735 7.442 9.744
Mkt Return 12.822 331.884 2.845 1.722 7.924
Monthly
25 Portfolios 1.445 67.474 0.074 8.432 0.82
49 Industry 1.172 56.702 0.053 8.707 0.71
Mkt Return 1.015 27.461 0.236 1.716 0.61
Annualized
25 Portfolios 17.34 735.537 0.847 8.847 9.846
49 Industry 14.059 703.804 0.647 8.561 8.52
Mkt Return 12.184 303.436 2.72 1.789 7.318
Republican
Annual Average Return Variance Std Error t-Statistic Population Avg
25 Portfolios 4.462 850.59 0.9 -7.608 11.31
49 Industry 4.407 933.318 0.736 -7.249 9.744
Mkt Return 3.142 514.531 3.5 -1.366 7.924
Monthly
25 Portfolios 0.211 66.667 0.073 -8.381 0.82
49 Industry 0.259 60.454 0.054 -8.331 0.71
Mkt Return 0.214 32.218 0.253 -1.566 0.61
Annualized
25 Portfolios 2.53 1544.047 1.213 -6.033 9.846
49 Industry 3.112 1040.318 0.777 -6.957 8.52
Mkt Return 2.567 467.446 3.336 -1.424 7.318
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Average Excess Returns– Legislative Branch Control
Democrat
Annual Average Return Variance Std Error t-Statistic Population Avg
25 Portfolios 13.752 986.402 0.847 2.884 11.31
49 Industry 11.598 972.886 0.657 2.823 9.744
Mkt Return 9.089 419.484 2.762 0.422 7.924
Monthly
25 Portfolios 1.035 59.354 0.060 3.577 0.82
49 Industry 0.852 53.903 0.045 3.174 0.71
Mkt Return 0.698 26.573 0.201 0.438 0.61
Annualized
25 Portfolios 12.42 846.836 0.785 3.280 9.846
49 Industry 10.22 812.46 0.6 2.832 8.52
Mkt Return 8.373 395.606 2.682 0.393 7.318
Republican
Annual Average Return Variance Std Error t-Statistic Population Avg
25 Portfolios 5.796 869.257 1.257 -4.386 11.31
49 Industry 5.826 1002.502 1.054 -3.716 9.744
Mkt Return 5.744 584.379 5.154 -0.423 7.924
Monthly
25 Portfolios 0.315 99.441 0.123 -4.120 0.82
49 Industry 0.396 77.8 0.085 -3.708 0.71
Mkt Return 0.437 41.813 0.398 -0.433 0.61
Annualized
25 Portfolios 3.778 2295.698 2.043 -2.970 9.846
49 Industry 4.747 1261.453 1.183 -3.190 8.52
Mkt Return 5.248 510.647 4.818 -0.430 7.318
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Average Excess Returns– Both Branches Control
Democrat
Annual Average Return Variance Std Error t-Statistic Population Avg
25 Portfolios 20.321 1011.864 1.107 8.137 11.31
49 Industry 16.563 992.527 0.856 7.962 9.744
Mkt Return 13.005 363.21 3.318 1.532 7.924
Monthly
25 Portfolios 1.593 75.727 0.087 8.827 0.82
49 Industry 1.269 60.587 0.061 9.144 0.71
Mkt Return 1.032 29.387 0.272 1.550 0.61
Annualized
25 Portfolios 19.110 848.408 1.014 9.135 9.846
49 Industry 15.223 770.137 0.754 8.885 8.520
Mkt Return 12.383 338.036 3.201 1.583 7.318
Republican
Annual Average Return Variance Std Error t-Statistic Population Avg
25 Portfolios 2.744 921.953 1.295 -6.616 11.31
49 Industry 2.73 1060.954 1.085 -6.467 9.744
Mkt Return 1.09 623.595 5.324 -1.284 7.924
Monthly
25 Portfolios 0.032 97.363 0.121 -6.491 0.82
49 Industry 0.11 78.208 0.085 -7.054 0.71
Mkt Return 0.048 42.532 0.401 -1.400 0.61
Annualized
25 Portfolios 0.385 2367.045 2.075 -4.560 9.846
49 Industry 1.325 1361.893 1.229 -5.855 8.52
Mkt Return 0.575 583.273 5.149 -1.309 7.318
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Appendix C
Years of Government Control Based on the Regime Change Dummy Variable
Regime Control Democrat(0) Years Republican(1) Years
Controls both branches* 1933-1946;
1949-1952;
1955-1980;
1987-1993;
2007-2009
54 1927-1932;
1947-1948;
1953-1954;
1981-1986;
1994-2006
29
*Controls the White House and at least one house of Congress. Control indicates the party with the majority elected seats in the house.
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Average Excess Returns Under the Regime Change Dummy Variable
Democrat(0)
Annual Average Return Variance Std Error t-Statistic Population Avg
25 Portfolios 14.111 997.127 0.859 3.260 11.31
49 Industry 11.927 983.341 0.666 3.275 9.744
Mkt Return 9.343 423.761 2.801 0.507 7.924
Monthly
25 Portfolios 1.062 60.23 0.061 3.963 0.82
49 Industry 0.876 54.563 0.045 3.664 0.71
Mkt Return 0.717 26.899 0.204 0.526 0.61
Annualized
25 Portfolios 12.746 856.182 0.796 3.641 9.846
49 Industry 10.513 821.076 0.609 3.272 8.52
Mkt Return 8.604 400.071 2.722 0.473 7.318
Republican(1)
Annual Average Return Variance Std Error t-Statistic Population Avg
25 Portfolios 6.092 726.012 1.001 -5.214 11.31
49 Industry 5.679 861.188 0.851 -4.776 9.744
Mkt Return 5.281 483.728 4.084 -0.647 7.924
Monthly
25 Portfolios 0.371 80.575 0.096 -4.675 0.82
49 Industry 0.401 66.567 0.068 -4.527 0.71
Mkt Return 0.41 35.803 0.321 -0.622 0.61
Annualized
25 Portfolios 4 .447 1794.462 1.573 -3.432 9.846
49 Industry 4.81 1037.469 0.934 -3.972 8.52
Mkt Return 4.922 420.064 3.806 -0.629 7.318
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